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EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
JURISPRUDENCE: SHOULD A CAUSE




The state of intercollegiate athletics continues to generate substan-
tial study and intense debate. 2 In 1990, the Knight Commission re-
leased a report which recommended major reforms and structural
changes in intercollegiate athletics. 3 The compromise of academic in-
tegrity was specifically identified as one of the critical issues confronting
intercollegiate athletics. 4 Public officials have also joined the chorus de-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. B.A.
1975, Stanford University; J.D. 1979, University of California at Berkeley School of Law.
1. This Article is a sequel to Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a
University's Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REV. 743 (1991). The
foregoing article focuses on the extent of the compromise of academic integrity in
intercollegiate athletics. That article also explored the nature of the express contractual
relationship between student-athletes and their institutions. Arguing that universities by
virtue of this contractual relationship make some form of educational commitment to
student-athletes, the article proposed that the good faith doctrine provides a mechanism
by which meaning can be given to an institution's otherwise vaguely expressed academic
obligation to student-athletes,
The scope of this Article is summarized in the text accompanying notes 20-34, infra.
2. Several comprehensive studies examining various aspects of intercollegiate athlet-
ics have recently been published. The Knight Foundation Commission released a report
examining the state of college athletics on Mar. 19, 1991. Gerald Eskenazi, Panel Tells
College Heads to Take Control of Athletics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at D25. OnJuly 3, 1991,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) released the first parts of a study
examining graduation rates for student-athletes. NCAA Findings from its Study of 3,288 Ath-
letes, USA TODAY, July 3, 1991, at 9C. A Chronicle of Higher Education survey, released
shortly before the NCAA study, also examined the graduation rates of student-athletes.
Douglas Lederman, College Athletes Graduate at Higher Rates Than Other Students, But Men's
Basketball Players Lag Far Behind, a Survey Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 1991 at Al,
A38. A paper entitled "Light and Shadows on College Athletes" examines the careers of
former student-athletes. CLIFFORD ADELMAN, OFFICE OF EDuc. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT,
LIGHT AND SHADOWS ON COLLEGE ATHLETES: COLLEGE TRANSCRIPTS AND LABOR MARKET
HISTORY (1990). In 1989, the United States General Accounting Office released informa-
tion concerning the academic performance of student-athletes. GAO, STUDENT ATHLETES:
INFORMATION ON THEIR ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE (1989).
Professor Murray Sperber provides a comprehensive examination of the financial, eth-
ical and academic issues confronting intercollegiate athletics in MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE
SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT vs. THE UNIVERSITY (1990). The role that inter-
collegiate athletics plays in American society is examined in DONALD CHU, THE CHARACTER
OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT (1989). Additional studies
and surveys are identified and discussed in Davis, supra note 1.
3. -REPORT OF THE KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KEEPING
FAITH WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1991)
[hereinafter KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. The Knight Commission's proposed changes
are discussed in detail in Davis, supra note 1, at 767-68.
4. KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-18.
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crying the condition of intercollegiate athletics. Federal legislation was
enacted in 1990 requiring colleges to disclose graduation rates for stu-
dent-athletes.5 Congressional hearings during the summer of 1991 fo-
cused on financial disclosure laws for college sports.6 Student-athletes
7
have taken steps to protect and promote their interests in the form of
private actions challenging the quality of the academic instruction they
received during college.8 A recent lawsuit9 asserted by a former basket-
ball scholarship student questioned Drake University's educational com-
mitment to student-athletes. 10 Shortly thereafter, a decision was
rendered in Ross v. Creighton University," a much celebrated 12 educa-
tional malpractice lawsuit asserted by a student-athlete.
Kevin Ross asserted claims against Creighton sounding in tort and
contract 13 for its alleged failure to provide him an opportunity to ac-
quire basic academic skills during his tenure at the university. 14 Ross's
dissatisfaction with Creighton stemmed from Creighton's recruitment of
5. Student Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (1990). See
Christopher J. Alessandro, Note, The Student-Athlete Right-to-Know Act: Legislation Would Re-
quire Colleges to Make Public Graduation Rates of Student-Athletes, 16J.C. & U.L. 287 (1989), for
a detailed discussion of the legislation. See also Davis, supra note 1, at 765-66 (summarizing
the parameters of the disclosure requirements).
6. Douglas Lederman, House Panel Hears Conflicting Testimony on Disclosure Law for Col-
lege Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 5, 1991, at A27. Governmental intervention is
further illustrated by federal legislation introduced in 1991 which would require the
NCAA to afford due process to those it investigates. Robert Sullivan, Watch Out, NCAA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1, 1991, at 9. A Florida state commission's review of NCAA
enforcement procedures and policies as a prerequisite to possible legislation illustrates
state legislators' interest in college athletics. Douglas Lederman, Facing Nationwide Chal-
lenges to its Investigative Policies, NCAA is Forced to Defend Itself at a Hearing in Florida, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 6, 1991, at A31 (noting that the states of Nevada, Nebraska and Flor-
ida have already enacted such legislation).
7. "Student-athlete" refers to college students who attend post-secondary institu-
tions on athletic scholarships. Davis, supra note 1, at 745 n.18; Derek Quinn Johnson,
Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
96 n.1 (1985).
8. Suits by student-athletes asserting educational malpractice claims against post-
secondary institutions include:Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942 (Iowa Dist. Polk
County, May 7, 1990); Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990);Jones
v. Williams, 431 N.W.2d 419 (1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 931 (1989); Echols v. Board
of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, No. 266-777 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Oct.
22, 1979). Refer to Davis, supra note 1, at 746 nn.19-21, for a discussion of the facts and
issues involved in these lawsuits.
9. In Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942, (Iowa Dist. Polk County, May 7,
1990), Terrell Jackson asserted breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and civil
rights claims against Drake University. The gravamen of Jackson's lawsuit was Drake's
alleged failure to afford him an opportunity to acquire a meaningful education.
10. Id.
11. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1319.
12. The Ross lawsuit and its underlying circumstances have attracted considerable at-
tention from the popular media. See, e.g.,Jack Curry, Suing for 2d Chance to Start Over, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1990, at B9; Charles Mount, Kevin Ross Sues Creighton, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
July 25, 1989, at C1; Matt O'Connor, Probation in Hotel Rampage, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 7,
1989, at C3.
A recent student note examines the decision rendered by the Ross court. Edmund J.
Sherman, Note, Good Sports, Bad Sports: The District Court Abandons College Athletes in Ross v.
Creighton University, 11 Loy. ENTER. L.J. 657 (1991).
13. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
14. Id.
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him to play basketball, notwithstanding the university's alleged knowl-
edge of his lack of preparedness to take advantage of the school's educa-
tional opportunities. 15  The essence of Ross's claims was that
Creighton's conduct amounted to educational malpractice.
16
In dismissing Ross's complaint, the federal district court aligned it-
self with the majority of courts that refuse to recognize a cause of action
for educational malpractice.' 7 Adopting the reasons enunciated by
these courts, Judge Nordberg cast the dispositive issue as whether an
institution of higher education owes a duty to provide student-athletes
with a minimal level of academic competence. 18 He concluded that an
examination of relevant public policy considerations-"the likelihood of
the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the
consequences of placing that burden upon defendant" '9 -dictated a
negative response to the controlling question.
This Article examines whether a doctrinal basis exists for legally
recognizing an educational malpractice claim in tort for student-athletes
against colleges and universities. Part II begins this inquiry by summa-
rizing the precedent for the result reached in Ross.20 In this regard, the
Article reviews the history of educational malpractice actions in the
United States. 2 1 Cases which demonstrate the judiciary's reluctance to
entertain suits for educational malpractice brought by students at all
levels of the educational process-whether it be primary, secondary or
post-secondary-are examined. 22 As a part of this examination, the
public policy considerations adopted by courts declining to legitimate
educational malpractice claims are closely scrutinized.2 3 This assess-
ment reveals that although policy considerations implicate valid social
and legal concerns, they are often based on invalid assumptions and
have not been subjected to in-depth judicial evaluation. 24 The fragility
of these policy considerations becomes even more apparent when ana-
lyzed in the context of educational malpractice actions brought by stu-
15. See id. at 1324; Davis, supra note 1, at 745; Sherman, supra note 12, at 661.
16. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322. Ross also asserted claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and breach of contract. Id. at 1329. The court acknowledged previous
Illinois precedent, which created a cause of action under certain circumstances for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of direct victims of malpractice. Id. The Ross
court ruled, however, that inasmuch as plaintiff did not possess a cognizable educational
malpractice claim, a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would not lie. Id. at
1330. Likewise, the court rejected Ross's breach of contract claim which it viewed as
merely an attempt to circumvent its refusal to recognize a tort-premised educational mal-
practice cause of action. Both the emotional distress and breach of contract claims are
beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the breach of contract claim, see
Davis, supra note 1.
17. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1327 (citing cases rejecting educational malpractice as a via-
ble cause of action in the context of elementary and secondary education). See infra text
accompanying notes 47-83, for an analysis of the leading cases.
18. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1327.
19. Id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 47-136.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 137-79.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
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dent-athletes against their schools. 25 This section concludes by
suggesting that the judiciary's unjustified reliance on dubious policies
serves as a convenient means by which courts evade determination of
the critical issue-whether the academic interests of particular plaintiffs
warrant protection against the conduct of academic institutions.
2 6
Part III of this Article focuses on this critical issue within the con-
text of the student-athlete/university relationship. It first notes that the
weakness of the policies relied on by courts to reject educational mal-
practice claims may alone be sufficient to warrant imposing a duty on
universities in favor of student-athletes. The Article next explores
whether an independent basis exists for creating such a duty.2 7 In this
regard, it examines whether traditional tort doctrine, either directly or
by analogy, justifies protecting a student-athlete's academic interests
from certain types of institutional conduct.28 The inquiry begins with an
analysis of the circumstances in which the judiciary exhibits a willingness
to subject colleges to tort liability for injuries to students.29 An exami-
nation of the in loco parentis doctrine reveals that institutions' liability to
students is not appropriately premised on that legal doctrine.30 This
part concludes that liability has been imposed on universities in situa-
tions where a traditionally recognized special relationship is present
between academic institutions and particular students. 3 1 The case law
unequivocally demonstrates that absent such a special relationship tort
claims by students against colleges fail to present justiciable
controversies.
32
The Article next discusses the policies on which these special rela-
tionships are founded. 33 Notions of dependency and mutual depen-
dency are understood as underlying recognition of special relationships.
Similarly, the student-athlete/university relationship is viewed not only
as one of mutual dependency, but also as a relationship in which the
university is clearly the dominant party. The Article concludes by pro-
posing that the dependency and vulnerability of student-athletes in their
relationship with colleges create a special relationship. This relationship
is sufficiently similar to those traditionally recognized in tort to justify
imposing a duty on colleges and universities to provide an educational
opportunity to student-athletes.
34
25. See infra text accompanying notes 180-91.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 195-252.
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 197-236.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 197-208.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 209-36.
32. Id.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 237-48.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 253-76.
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II. THE HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
A. Judicial Refusal to Recognize Educational Malpractice
A review of educational malpractice jurisprudence in the United
States is the first step in understanding the competing legal and policy
issues implicated in assessing whether to recognize a tort of educational
malpractice in favor of student-athletes. This section summarizes the
treatment the judiciary has afforded educational malpractice claims.
What appears in the case law is a common theme of judicial reluctance
and hesitancy to interject itself in disputes questioning the substantive
quality of the education conferred by institutions on their students.
1. Educational Malpractice Defined
Suits against educators traditionally have centered on issues such as
safety, supervision and student discipline.3 5 In contrast, educational
malpractice refers to complaints against academics and academic institu-
tions alleging professional misconduct analogous to medical and legal
malpractice. 36 Educational malpractice has been viewed as premised on
the notion that academic institutions have a legal obligation to instruct
students in such a manner as to impart a minimal level of competence in
basic subjects. 37 The theory behind educational malpractice has also
been described as placing a duty on schools to provide that standard of
education appropriate for the particular student.
3 8
In bringing to the forefront the alleged failure of colleges to pro-
vide educational opportunity to students, 9 lawsuits by student-athletes
are premised on a similar if not the same theory. Student-athletes desire
an opportunity to derive substantive educational benefits during their
college careers. 40 They argue that institutional conduct, both passive
and affirmative, interferes with their ability to make academic progress
and acquire useful skills.
4 1
35. Judith H. Berliner Cohen, Note, The ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the
Functionally Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293, 299 (1978);J. COLLIS, EDUCA-
TIONAL MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF EDUCATORS, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, AND SCHOOL OF-
FICIALS (1990).
36. Kimberly A. Wilkins, Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Need of a Call
for Action, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 427, 429 (1988).
37. Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theoyy, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743, 746-47 (1981).
38. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 7-8. This definition emphasizes that the relevancy of
peculiar needs of individual students, or groups of students, may be particularly pertinent
in the context of educational malpractice claims brought by student-athletes. Arguably,
student-athletes' needs are distinctly different from those of other students due to the
circumstances that often accompany their attendance at college as well as the essence of
their relationship with their schools. See infra text accompanying notes 253-76.
39. Student-athletes seek to impose a duty on colleges and universities to provide
them with an educational opportunity in contrast to a duty to educate. Refer to Davis, supra
note 1, at 788-89, and sources cited therein for a discussion of the ramifications of defining
the duty as one to provide an educational opportunity rather than a duty to educate.
40. See id. at 789.
41. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 249-51 (discussing the types of claims stu-
dent-athletes assert against colleges).
1992]
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2. Judicial Treatment of Educational Malpractice at the Primary
and Secondary School Levels
Educational malpractice suits in the context of student or parental
claims against elementary and secondary schools4 2 typically arise in two
factual contexts.43 In one group of cases, secondary school students al-
lege negligent acts or omissions by their schools resulting in the convey-
ance of inadequate basic academic skills or intellectual damage.4 4 These
cases can be properly classified as pure educational malpractice actions
because students challenge the quality of the academic instruction they
receive. The second category of cases typically involves grade school
students alleging improper placement in special education programs ac-
cording to their academic and physical needs. For example, in Hoffman
v. Board of Education,4 5 a child placed in classes for the mentally retarded
after he was misdiagnosed sought damages for injury to his emotional
well-being and his inability to obtain employment. Relying on a broadly
42. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 79, 88; Funston, supra note 37, at 750.
43. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 325, 335; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442.
44. Illustrative "pure" educational malpractice cases include: Peter W. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (refusing to recognize claim alleging
plaintiff was permitted to obtain degree without having acquired basic academic skills);
Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Term. 1980) (ex-
tending policies of Donohue in refusing to recognize educational malpractice claim brought
against a private school).
45. 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); see Catherine D. McBride, Note, Educational Malprac-
tice: Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students; A State Law
Cause of Action for Educational Malpractice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 475, 479 (finding Hoffman
paradigmatic of the second category of educational malpractice cases). In Hoffman, the
court framed the controlling issue as whether public policy considerations precluded re-
covery for the allegedly negligent evaluation of a student's intellectual capacity. Hoffman,
400 N.E.2d at 318. Relying on a broadly stated policy of non-interference in academic
matters, which it had articulated in Donohue, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division's affirmance of a jury award in favor of plaintiff. In dismissing plaintiff's educa-
tional malpractice claim, the court acknowledged a distinction between educational mal-
practice cases involving nonfeasance, such as in Peter W. and Donohue, and those involving
the type of misfeasance raised by plaintiff. Yet the court rejected any notion that this
distinction should alter its determination not to recognize a cause of action for educational
malpractice. Id. at 319. The court held the policy concerns expressed in Donohue were
equally applicable to an educational malpractice claim alleging misfeasance. Id.
Other cases illustrating the second category of malpractice claims include: D.S.W. v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981) (complaint alleging
failure to discover learning disability and improper placement dismissed for failure to state
claim); Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Sch., 419 So.2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff
alleging school mistesting and misclassification resulted in student's improper placement
into special education program failed to state a cognizable cause of action); Hunter v.
Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982) (holding educational malpractice claim asserting
negligent evaluation failed to state justiciable controversy in light of evaluating relevant
public policy considerations); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982) (relying on
reasons set forth in Hoffman, court dismissed complaint alleging negligent evaluation and
placement of student with learning disabilities); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs.,
474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (public policy reasons justify
dismissal of functionally illiterate student's educational malpractice claims).
Notwithstanding the preceding authority, in one particularly shocking case of alleged
improper placement, the court held for plaintiff but sidestepped creating a new tort of
educational malpractice by finding that school employees acted as medical personnel.
Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), af'd, 475 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984);
COLLIS, supra note 35, at 155; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 482.
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stated policy of non-interference in academic matters, the New York
Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff's educational malpractice claim.
46
Central to these cases is the belief that schools possess a duty to prop-
erly evaluate and place each child in a learning environment appropriate
to his or her needs.
4 7
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,48 the seminal educa-
tional malpractice case,4 9 also represents the quintessential pure educa-
tional malpractice case.50 The plaintiff was a functionally illiterate5 1
high school graduate5 2 who alleged that defendant's acts and omissions
deprived him of basic academic skills such as reading and writing. This,
according to plaintiff, resulted from defendant's negligent 5 3 perform-
ance of its duty to provide him with adequate instruction and counseling
in basic academic skills.5 4 Focusing on the duty55 element of a cogniza-
ble negligence cause of action,56 the court rejected plaintiff's assertion
that the school district owed such a duty.
5 7
In so ruling, the court linked its determination of whether the
school district owed a duty to plaintiff to broader issues of public pol-
46. Hoffman, 400 N.E.2d at 319-21.
47. See cases cited supra note 45.
48. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
49. Cohen, supra note 35.
50. The two categories of educational malpractice claims have been differentiated as
follows:
Hoffman represents not only the extension of Donohue to claims arising from spe-
cial education, but also represents a second category of cases alleging educational
malpractice. Peter W. and Donohue can be thought of as presenting claims for neg-
ligence in the process of educating, while Hoffman is better viewed as an action for
negligence in educational evaluation.
Eugene R. Butler, Comment, Educational Malpractice Update, 14 CAP. U. L. REv. 609, 613
(1985); see McBride, supra note 45, at 479 n.41. One commentator describes claims involv-
ing the process of educating as cases in which the adequacy or competency of the instruc-
tion is attacked. Butler, supra at 613, 615. See also Funston, supra note 37, at 758
(suggesting that the genre of cases represented by Hoffman should not be conceptualized
as educational malpractice cases since they are more closely analogous to cases imposing
liability on schools in the context of special education programs).
51. "Functional illiteracy" refers to inadequate application of basic academic skills
such as reading, writing and arithmetic to practical problems encountered daily. Wilkins,
supra note 36, at 429 n.l1.
52. Despite having attended public schools for 12 years, plaintiff attained a fifth grade
reading level. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
53. Plaintiff sought recovery based upon theories sounding in misrepresentation,
breach of statutory duty and breach of constitutional duty. Id. at 856, 862; CoLus, supra
note 35, at 83.
54. Specific, allegedly negligent acts included defendant's: (1) failure to apprehend
plaintiff's learning disability; (2) assigning plaintiff to classes for which he was academi-
cally inadequately prepared; (3) promotion of plaintiff to higher grade levels despite
knowledge of plaintiff's unpreparedness to succeed academically at these levels; and
(4) permitting plaintiff to graduate from high school even though he read at a fifth grade
level. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
55. Plaintiff identified three possible sources for imposing such a duty on defendant:
(1) defendant's obligation to exercise with reasonable care its assumption of the educa-
tional function; (2) the special relationship between the student and teacher; and (3) com-
mon law duty requiring teachers to exercise reasonable care in instructing students. Id. at
858.
56. Id. at 857.
57. Id. at 861.
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icy. 58 Relying upon Rowland v. Christian,5 9 the court first discussed gen-
eral policy considerations critical in evaluating whether to recognize a
duty regardless of the factual context in which the issue arose.60 The
court next delineated policy considerations specifically applicable to the
factual scenario before it. The primary policy concerns 6 1 were charac-
terized as the nonexistence of a standard of care for educators and the
improbability of a court arriving at such a standard.6 2 Another policy
consideration was the difficulty of establishing the causal connection be-
tween defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injuries due to the multiplicity
of factors affecting academic performance. 63 Finally, the court was very
concerned about the adverse financial impact countless numbers of
claims might have on school systemsfr4
Later courts have relied upon these and additional public policy
considerations to reject educational malpractice claims. 65 In Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District, plaintiff's school authorites promoted
him from grade to grade despite knowledge of his learning disabilities
and awarded him a diploma, notwithstanding his failure to acquire basic
academic skills.6 6 The court concluded plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action, buttressing its decision with a policy of judicial non-
interference in academic affairs. The court defined the policy of non-
interference as founded on the judiciary's perceived lack of acumen in
matters involving education policy, as well as a lack of competence to
oversee day-to-day administration of public schools. 6 7
B.M. v. State68 represents the single instance6 9 where a court recog-
nized educational malpractice as a tort cause of action. The plaintiff al-
58. Funston, supra note 37, at 751.
59. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
60. These policies included: (1) the foreseeability of harm resulting from defendant's
deviation from the standard of care; (2) establishing injury with sufficient certainty;
(3) the closeness of the causal connection between defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered; (4) the moral culpability of defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of deterring fu-
ture harm; and (6) the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60; see also Rowland, 443
P.2d at 564.
61. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 437.
62. The court stated, "we find in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of
care' against which defendants' alleged conduct can be measured (citation omitted) ......
Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
63. The court identified physical, neurological, emotional, cultural and environmental
as the factors external to the formal teaching process that may affect academic perform-
ance. Id.
64. Id.; McBride, supra note 45, at 476.
65. McBride, supra note 45, at 476; CoLLis, supra note 35, at 102 (noting that courts
deciding similar cases have cited Peter W. and Donohue as persuasive authority).
66. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
67. Id. at 1355. According to the court, recognition of an educational malpractice
action would not only require the court to develop general education policies but would
require it to "sit in review of the day-to-day implementation" of those policies. Id.
68. 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
69. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442 (noting that B.M. is the one instance in which a
court has "refused to attach the fatal 'educational malpractice' label to this type of claim");
McBride, supra note 45, at 483 (concluding that Montana is the only jurisdiction to permit
relief for educational malpractice).
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leged that she was negligently placed in a special education program
when she was six years old. 70 The defendant urged the court to dismiss
the action on grounds of governmental immunity and lack of legal duty
to the improperly placed child.7 1 Although the court did not identify
the case as an action for educational malpractice, the case still falls
within the non-pure category of educational malpractice claims. 72 A
sharply divided court held that a duty of care arose out of the regula-
tions and statutes governing student placement in special education pro-
grams.73 The court also concluded, however, that absent a clear
statutory declaration, public policy considerations relating to judicial re-
luctance to interfere in the administration of a special education pro-
gram justify refusal to recognize the duty.74 No determination was
made as to whether the duty had been breached or what damages would
flow from such a breach.
75
Arguably, B.M. is of little precedential value to plaintiffs asserting
educational malpractice actions. The court's reliance on the mandatory
statute as the source of the school's duty lends no indication that liability
might lie absent the statute. In fact, the concurring chief justice at-
tempted to limit the reach of the majority's ruling by specifically point-
ing to the statute as the source of the school's duty.76 Because negligent
classification and placement were the essence of plaintiff's claims,77
B.M.'s precedential value is arguably reduced in the pure educational
malpractice context, which implicates a different type of dissatisfaction
with the process of educating. Cases such as B.M. may fail to implicate
the process of educating. The dissatisfaction present in B.M. and similar
cases can be characterized as the failure of an institution to advance a
student to the educational level that he or she is actually capable of com-
prehending as a result of an improper evaluation of the student's capac-
ity to learn.78  Thus, B.M. and similar cases become readily
distinguishable from pure educational malpractice claims, which impli-
cate the substantive quality of the educational process. 79
If a recent case, Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc.,8° reflects the cur-
70. B.M., 649 P.2d at 425.
71. Id. at 426. Plaintiff also urged the court to dismiss the complaint due to its alleged
immunity as a governmental entity for discretionary acts.
72. As noted by the concurring judge, the case subjudicia differed from those such as
Peter W., which involved "negligent failure to adequately educate a child in basic academic
skills." Id. at 428. See McBride, supra note 45, at 483 (comparing the facts in B.M. to those
involved in Hoffman); Butler, supra note 50, at 615 (asserting that plaintiffs' claims in both
B.M. and Hoffman were premised on negligent evaluation); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442
(concluding the facts of B.M. resemble those of Hoffman).
73. B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 428 (Haswell, CJ., concurring) (distinguishing Peter W. and Donahue).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
78. Funston, supra note 37, at 747 n.13.
79. See supra note 49 (the gist of educational malpractice differs for the two categories
of educational malpractice claims which have been asserted by plaintiffs at the primary and
secondary school levels).
80. 793 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
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rent judicial attitude towards educational malpractice claims at the pri-
mary and secondary school levels, courts will not soon depart from the
stance taken in Peter W., Hoffman and their progeny. Rich involved al-
leged educational malpractice stemming from improper evaluation and
placement.8 1 Addressing an issue of first impression in Kentucky,8 2 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on the policy justifications articulated
in Peter W. and Donohue to conclude plaintiff's complaint failed to pres-
ent a justiciable controversy.
8 3
3. Judicial Reluctance at the Post-Secondary School Level
a. Traditional Claims Against Colleges and Universities
Historically, student claims against colleges and universities have
fallen into a few broad categories. Students have most often turned to
the judiciary for relief for injuries resulting from disciplinary8 4 or aca-
demic8 5 decisions made by post-secondary institutions.8 6 Typical exam-
ples include a student alleging denial of an academic right, such as
dismissal for poor grades,8 7 or allegations that an institution engaged in
improper disciplinary action, such as suspension for cheating.
8 8
81. Id. at 834.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 836.
84. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961) (disciplinary decisions of a public college were subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause). The court held that students expelled for partic-
ipating in off-campus demonstrations were denied due process when they were neither
given notice of the charges against them nor afforded a hearing. Id. at 158-59; see also Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Dixon is widely recognized as the first case in American
jurisprudence to constrain the previously unfettered discretion universities exercised over
students. Gerard A. Fowler, The Legal Relationship Between the American College Student and the
College: A Historical Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 401, 408-09
(1984); Donald L. Reidhaar, The Assault on the Citadel Reflections on A Quarter Century of
Change in the Relationship Between the Student and the University, 12J.C. & U.L. 343, 346 (1985);
see Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26
STAN. L. REv. 95, 96, 98, 99 (1973) (noting that prior to 1961, courts almost unanimously
upheld the expulsion of students from both private and public colleges).
85. Examples of suits brought alleging injurious academic decisions by colleges or
universities include: Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Doherty
v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988) (former student alleging
improper denial of degree); Schuler v. University of Minn., 788 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); Gasper v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975) (involv-
ing nursing student dismissed for academic reasons from tax-supported vocational
school); Stoller v. College of Medicine, 562 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa. 1983), af'd, 727 F.2d
1101 (3rd Cir. 1984); Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108 (Minn.
1977) (court holding that student claiming arbitrary dismissal from law school stated a
claim for relief); Marquez v. University of Wash., 648 P.2d 94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), rev.
denied, 97 Wash. 1037 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983) (extending substantial lati-
tude to educational institutions in academic matters including academic aid); Dillingham v.
University of Colo. Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (suit by a medical
student who was dismissed for academic reasons from university's medical school
program).
86. See Fowler, supra note 84, at 401.
87. Audrey Latourette & Robert King,Judicial Intervention in the Student-University Rela-
tionship: Due Process and Contract Theories, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 199, 203 (1988).
88. Id. The authors conclude that notwithstanding the "notion ofjudicial non-inter-
ference in college affairs," students enrolled in public colleges are afforded due process
protection in regard to disciplinary and academic matters, albeit to a lesser extent with
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b. Educational Malpractice Claims
College students pursuing pure educational malpractice claims, like
their primary and secondary school counterparts, allege denial or depri-
vation of a certain quantum of substantive educational benefits. Unlike
their counterparts, however, college students premise educational mal-
practice actions not only on tort but other substantive theories as well-
principally breach of contract and misrepresentation. This has not,
however, translated into more favorable treatment. The judiciary, rely-
ing on the policies established in cases involving claims against primary
and secondary academic institutions, has refused to recognize educa-
tional malpractice however framed as a viable claim against colleges and
universities.
i. Quasi-Educational Malpractice
Initially it should be noted that pure educational malpractice claims
against institutions of higher education are notable for their paucity.
Pure educational malpractice claims require a court to engage in an eval-
uation of the quality of the academic instruction provided by an institu-
tion. At the post-secondary level, these claims are distinguished from
those which in form may appear to allege educational malpractice but in
substance allege student dissatisfaction tangential to the substantive
quality of the educational process. These other cases involve claims
analogous to those asserted in the Hoffman and B.M. category of educa-
tional malpractice actions. Thus, they can properly be denominated as
quasi-educational malpractice cases since the essence of plaintiffs' actions
are peripheral to the substantive quality of education provided by col-
leges and universities.8 9 Differentiation between pure and quasi-educa-
tional malpractice dispels any illusion that courts exhibit a greater
willingness to recognize educational malpractice claims brought against
colleges and universities. The differentiation illustrates that courts have
had very few occasions to address the question of educational malprac-
tice at the post-secondary level. In addition, the characterization of a
claim often impacts the ultimate resolution of the suit.
Quasi-educational malpractice claims at the post-secondary level
respect to the latter. Id. at 220, 227-29. Professors Latourette and King also conclude that
relying upon contract principles, private college students achieve the same, if not greater,
due process protections afforded public college students. Id. at 231.
Two other categories of claims beyond the scope of this paper are commonly asserted
against post-secondary institutions: those by handicapped and those by minority students
asserting discriminatory treatment. Fowler, supra note 84, at 401.
89. The "quasi" designation may be applied to cases that arise in both factual con-
texts-the primary/secondary and post-secondary school levels-because of the indirect
nature of the challenges to substantive adequacy of the education. It should be noted,
however, that these factual settings produce different forms of student dissatisfaction and
accordingly different types of claims. The discussion below explains that quasi-educa-
tional malpractice claims against colleges typically involve allegations of breach of express
contractual commitments and abuse of academic discretion. As discussed above, B.M. and
Hoffman are the paradigmatic quasi-educational malpractice claims at the primary and sec-
ondary school levels.
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typically include those in which students allege institutions breached an
express contractual commitment or exercised academic discretion un-
fairly. For example, in Dizick v. Umpqua Community College,90 plaintiffs
who enrolled in a welding technology program 9 ' alleged that, contrary
to representations contained in the college's course catalogue, certain
courses were not offered and certain materials were not available for
their use.92 As a result, plaintiffs asserted that they were inadequately
prepared to enter the marketplace as welders upon completion of the
one-year program. They further argued that this inadequate program
was contrary to representations set forth in the school catalogue.
The Oregon Court of Appeals framed the dispositive issue as
whether the promised level of proficiency could be achieved without the
practical usage and training.9 3 Concluding that to make such a determi-
nation would intrude upon the state's discretionary functions, the court
rejected plaintiffs' claim on grounds that such a decision should be made
by the legislature and not the judiciary. 9 4 At the same time, the court
emphasized that a different result might be warranted if the institution
had breached a specific promise to include practical training in its weld-
ing curriculum.9 5
Even though the court made no reference to educational malprac-
tice, such a characterization implicates the adequacy or quality of the
academic offerings. The court's transformation of what in essence was a
promissory fraud action into one for educational malpractice is under-
scored by the following statement: "The method of instruction and
course content obviously involve complex judgmental decisions by col-
lege officials. A jury verdict here is tantamount to a direction to the
college to provide practical use training as part of the curriculum for the
courses offered in the catalog."'9 6 Thus, the court of appeals character-
ized plaintiffs' educational malpractice claims as a challenge of the suffi-
ciency of the courses offered to adequately educate the students. In
actuality, however, plaintiffs' dissatisfaction arose not from the content
of the course offering but the failure of the college to offer what it had
previously represented.
The Oregon Supreme Court correctly adopted this characterization
in reversing the lower court.9 7 Quoting from the dissent at the court of
appeals, the supreme court stated:
While I agree that an action based on the failure of the college
90. 577 P.2d 534 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 537.
94. The court also ruled that the college was immune from tort liability for the alleged
misconduct. Id. at 539. Disagreeing with this characterization, the dissentingjudge viewed
the cases as turning on what specific representations were made regarding the machines
which would be available, not on the level of proficiency plaintiffs would attain from their
participation in the program. Id. (Schwab, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 538.
96. Id. at 537.
97. Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 599 P.2d 444 (Or. 1979).
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to include certain courses in the curriculum or teach certain
techniques in the courses would be barred by governmental im-
munity, I see no relevance to that position in this case. The
plaintiff sued on account of statements made to him in order to
induce his enrollment.
98
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence was in-
troduced to substantiate a case of promissory fraud.9 9
Woodruffv. Georgia '0 0 provides another illustration of a quasi-educa-
tional malpractice case since it arose in an academic context but failed to
require the court to evaluate the quality of the education in order to
reach a decision. There, a student alleged inter alia that the university
negligently supervised her graduate studies program. 1° 1 Couching a
claim in this manner suggested a pure educational malpractice claim
hinging on the failure of a student's instructors to provide the guidance
necessary for her to benefit academically. The gist of plaintiff's lawsuit,
however, was that certain of the university's professors refused to sub-
mit recommendations required for her to proceed from a masters to a
doctoral program of study. 10 2 Thus, the central issue in Woodruff was
whether the academic decision rendered by the university violated plain-
tiff's due process rights or, as stated by the court, whether relief could
be granted for alleged impropriety in teachers' academic assessment of
plaintiff's work.
10 3
The same quasi-educational characterization can be given to Smith
v. Ohio State University. 10 4 There, a graduate student sued the university
on theories of negligence and breach of contract alleging that defendant
failed to provide timely advice with respect to the researching and draft-
ing of his master's thesis.' 0 5 Once again, despite the plaintiff's couch-
ing of his claim, the heart of the action was unrelated to the nature,
quality or adequacy of the education defendant conveyed to plaintiff. 106
98. Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 445.
100. 304 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1983).
101. Id. at 698.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 699.
104. 557 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1990).
105. Id. at 859.
106. See also Chevlin v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 260 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989). In Chevlin, the plaintiff, who enrolled in a nuclear medicine technology
program offered by the defendant community college, was dismissed allegedly due to her
poor performance in the program. Plaintiff argued that her dismissal resulted in part from
the college's failure to perform its duties including supervising and training her. Id. at 631.
The court characterized plaintiff's claim as one for educational malpractice and declined
to hold the district liable for the reasons set forth in Peter W. Id. Despite the court's charac-
terization of the claim as one for educational malpractice, the gist of the action appears to
have been wrongful dismissal and thus called into question whether the district had prop-
erly exercised its academic discretion. See also Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258
N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1977) (in addition to alleging wrongful dismissal, student alleged
breach of contract).
In Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, No. 2-748-100009, Second Circuit Court,
County of Fairfield at Bridgeport (Aug. 22, 1974), plaintiff alleged the content of the
course differed from the description set forth in the school bulletin which plaintiff had
relied on in deciding to enroll in the course. Plaintiff's allegations appeared to sound in
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ii. Pure Educational Malpractice
A survey of the few pure educational malpractice cases at the post-
secondary educational level reveals a strong judicial disinclination to
sustain such claims in tort. In rejecting educational malpractice as a
cause of action at this level, the judiciary has relied on the policy justifi-
cations developed by courts which refuse to embrace educational mal-
practice in the primary and secondary school context.
In Moore v. Vanderloo,10 7 an educational malpractice action arose out
of unique circumstances. The action was asserted not by a student of
the defendant but by a patient of a graduate of a chiropractic college.
The plaintiff alleged that her injuries could have been avoided if the
college had properly instructed its former student on the risks attendant
to certain techniques.' 0 8 The court viewed plaintiff's claim as implicat-
ing the quality of the education provided, thereby creating an issue of
educational malpractice. 10 9 The court began its analysis of the educa-
tional malpractice issue by acknowledging the differences between the
case sub judice and others in which educational malpractice was at is-
sue. 10 The court noted that most of the other cases involved claims by
students against public school districts at the primary and secondary
school level. 1 ' Distinctions between various types of educational mal-
practice cases did not militate against adhering to the authority created
by and policies articulated in those cases.1 12 In concluding that there
was no justiciable controversy, the court adopted the rule of law estab-
lished in cases such as Peter W. and Donohue and the policy justifications
set forth therein. 113
breach of an express contractual commitment and misrepresentation. After the presenta-
tion of evidence, the court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Other quasi-
educational malpractice cases in which the defendant is alleged to have breached an ex-
press contractual promise include: Peretti v. State of Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont.
1979); Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); and Stad
v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career Sch., 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 197 1). See
discussion infra note 134.
In Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D. Il. 1990), the court noted
that a different result would ensue .if plaintiff could establish breach of a specific contract
provision. In the court's view such a scenario does not implicate educational malpractice.
107. 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986).
108. Id. at 113.
109. Id.
110. According to the court, educational malpractice claims arise out of a limited
number of factual contexts and can be placed into three categories: (1) claims alleging a
public school district breached a duty to teach a student basic skills; (2) cases involving
negligent evaluation or placement of a public school student; and (3) a case involving a
physician alleging he committed malpractice due to inadequate supervision. Id.
I11. Id.
112. Id. at 114.
113. First, the court was persuaded that the absence of a standard of care by which to
measure the defendant's conduct militated against imposing a duty. It deemed itself un-
prepared to determine what a reasonable chiropractic institution should have taught its
students. Id. The court credited Peter W. as establishing a justification for not recognizing
an educational malpractice cause of action. Id. Second, the court relied on the perceived
inherent uncertainty in determining proximate causation in educational malpractice suits.
Id. Quoting from Donohue, the court stated "[w]e agree with the New York Court of Ap-
peals' observation that although it may assume too much to conclude that proximate cau-
[Vol. 69:1
EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
The policies of Peter W. and Donohue were also adopted by the court
in Swidryic v. Saint Michael's Medical Center,'1 4 which involved an educa-
tional malpractice claim arising out of facts similar to those in Moore.
Plaintiff, who had been sued for medical malpractice, alleged defendant
failed to train him adequately during his medical school residency.
115
The critical issue was whether a physician may assert a claim for educa-
tional malpractice against his residency program.1 6 Noting the factual
differences 1 7 between the matter before it and cases such as Peter W,
the court concluded that the same policy concerns expressed in those
cases applied to the educational malpractice claim asserted in this partic-
ular context.' 18 The court went on to identify additional public policy
considerations specific to the facts before it. The court expressed con-
cern that recognition of plaintiff's claim would result in: (1) unwar-
ranted judicial intervention into the day-to-day academic decisions of a
graduate medical school;'19 and (2) an increased judicial administrative
burden which would arise if physicians were permitted to sue their medi-
cal school every time they were sued for medical malpractice. 12
0
Wilson v. Continental Insurance Cos. 121 established the precedent, later
relied upon by the Ross court, that educational malpractice claims at the
post-secondary level fail to present justiciable controversies. In Wilson, a
former law student initiated a negligence action against Marquette Uni-
versity. 122 Wilson alleged he suffered serious mental problems result-
ing from his participation in a mind-control program aimed towards
minority students entering the university's law school with lower admis-
sions standards than white students. 123 He further alleged that the law
school coerced students into participating in the program (by giving
special grading consideration to participants) despite the program's ad-
verse recommendation from the university's counseling center. 124 The
court focused on the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of harm and
sation could never be established, that 'this element might indeed be difficult, if not
impossible to prove.'" (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). Id. The burden
which would be placed on schools and judicial reluctance to interfere in the daily opera-
tions of educational institutions were noted as two other justifications for not recognizing
educational malpractice claims. Id. at 114-15.
114. 493 A.2d 641 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1985).
115. Id. at 642.
116. Id. at 644.
117. The court identified three factual differences between this case and others such as
Peter W., which involved educational malpractice: (1) plaintiffwas a physician-not a grade
school student; (2) plaintiff's attendance was not mandatory, as is the case with primary
and secondary school students; and (3) defendant was a graduate school and not a school
board. Id. at 643-44.
118. Id.
119. In this regard, the court emphasized that the judiciary should not usurp the legis-
latively granted authority of the state board of medical examiners to develop standards for,
and evaluate the quality of, the medical school's academic program. Id. at 644-45.
120. Id. at 645. The court foresaw an increase in the amount of time required to try
malpractice cases and potential juror confusion. Id.
121. 274 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. 1979).
122. Id. at 680-81.
123. Id. at 681.
124. Id.
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concluded defendant could not be held liable for offering a course and
failing to discover the possible adverse psychiatric and psychological ef-
fects on particular students. 125 The court further stated that it was not
prepared to impose a duty on schools to conduct psychiatric or psycho-
logical evaluations of students in order to ascertain possible negative
susceptibility to particular educational offerings. The court enunciated
the following policy considerations as further support for its holding:
[B]ecause of the demands society places upon schools this
court will not promote a legal doctrine which would require
educational systems to litigate every suit claiming negligence in
the selection of curriculum, teaching methods, teachers or ex-
tra curricular activities. To rule otherwise would subject
schools to constant harassment in the courts. We cannot foist
such an unreasonable burden upon our schools without being
fearful of the irreparable harm that might be done to public
and private education.
126
Even though the court made no reference to educational malpractice,
the above quoted statement is a reiteration of the fear of litigation ra-
tionale relied upon by courts refusing to impose a duty on schools.
1 2 7
In Wickstrom v. North Idaho College,128 a group of students asserted a
tort claim against the institution for alleged failure to educate them as
promised in the school bulletin. The basis for the claim was that the
quality of provided education varied from the quality of education the
students believed to be promised in the school bulletin. 129 Due to the
students' non-compliance with the notice provision of the state tort
claims act, their tort action was dismissed.
Wickstrom is nevertheless notable for dicta stating that, notwith-
standing dismissal of the tort action, plaintiffs could state a viable breach
of contract action if evidence demonstrated that the defendant failed to
comply with the terms of the implied contract between the college and
the students.1 30 As an illustration of such a breach, the court stated that
"if certain fundamentals of the course necessary to attaining qualifica-
tion as an 'entry-level journeyman' were not even presented in the
course, such could be a breach of the implied contract between the col-
lege and the students."' 13 The court noted that "fundamentals" might
include the number of days or hours required to complete the subject
course. The court provided this illustration, no doubt, to ameliorate
concerns that a plaintiff might attempt to rely on this statement to pur-
sue an educational malpractice claim under the guise of a breach of con-
125. Id. at 684.
126. Id. at 686.
127. Note also that plaintiff's claims are analogous to those in which students at the
primary and secondary levels allege negligent evaluation and placement.
128. 725 P.2d 155 (1986).
129. Plaintiff's specific allegation was that, contrary to statements in the school bulle-
tin, they were not qualified as entry level journeymen upon successful completion of the
course of study. Id. at 156.
130. Id. at 157.
131. Id.
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tract action. In this regard, the court added that educational malpractice
claims implicate subjective factors such as teaching methodology.
1 3 2
On the other hand, the objective nature of the fundamentals identified
by the court did not implicate the policy considerations pertinent to ed-
ucational malpractice suits.
13 3
A strongly worded dissent disapproved of the majority's attempt to
distinguish a breach of contract action from an educational malpractice
claim. After summarizing cases rejecting educational malpractice
claims, the dissent acknowledged that a breach of contract action might
lie against an educational institution under limited circumstances which
would not involve the quality or adequacy of the instruction provided by
a school.13 4 The dissent viewed the present action as relating directly to
the quality and adequacy of the education supplied by the college.'
3 5
According to the dissent: "The claim requires the fact finder to enter
the classroom and determine whether or not the judgments, curricula
and teaching styles of the professional educators involved were defi-
cient. Thus, the plaintiff's claims require an analysis of the educational
function itself."' 3 6 The dissent's concerns seem overstated. The "fun-
damentals" identified by the majority are similar to those forming the
basis of the breach of contract claims in the cases cited with approval by
the dissent.
Courts presented with educational malpractice claims against col-
leges and universities13 7 have followed the approach taken by courts
132. Id. at 157-58.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 160 (Donaldson, C.J., dissenting). The dissent gave two illustrations of
when a breach of contract action would be distinct and clearly distinguishable from an
educational malpractice action under the guise of a contract claim. One illustration occurs
when a college accepts tuition from a student but provides no educational services. Peretti
v. State of Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979), is a case that appears to fall into this
category. There the state terminated an aviation technology program after plaintiff had
been enrolled in the program for three quarters. The program's elimination precluded
plaintiffs from completing their training and rendered the three quarters of course work
completed of dubious value. Id. at 786. Ruling in favor of plaintiffs, the court found the
existence of an implied contract that plaintiffs would be given an opportunity to complete
their training if they enrolled in the aviation technology program. Id. at 787.
The other illustration provided by the dissent occurs when the contract obligates the
educational institution to complete certain services and it fails to comply with this obliga-
tion such as in Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
Zumbrun arose out of a professor's early termination of a course-as an anti-war protest, he
refused to give all scheduled lectures and to give a final examination. Id. at 502. Plaintiff
alleged deprivation of her education and injuries resulting therefrom. Id. After character-
izing the student/university relationship as contractual in nature, the court held that the
university had breached its contractual obligation to give a course that consisted of a cer-
tain number of lectures and a final examination. Id. at 504-05. Thus, the true essence of
the complaint went not to the quality of the education provided but rather to defendant's
failure to provide that which was promised.
Similarly in Stad v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career Sch., 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1971), the court held that a career training school breached a promise of a guaran-
tee ofjob placement which was contained in its implied contract with plaintiff. Id. at 922.
135. WVickstrom, 725 P.2d at 160.
136. Id.
137. The quality of the education provided by a post-secondary institution was also
attacked in Huckabay v. Netterville, 263 So.2d 113 (La. Ct. App. 1972). A law school
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confronted with this issue at the primary and secondary school levels. In
so doing, these courts have not made an independent assessment of
whether the differences in the factual circumstances warrant reaching a
different result. Moreover, they have not undertaken a critical analysis
of the soundness of the policies on which educational malpractice claims
have been denied.
B. Examining Public Policy Considerations
Peter W, Donohue and their progeny clearly illustrate that courts have
uniformly rejected a cause of action for educational malpractice. 13 8 Ex-
isting precedent also make apparent that the foremost obstacles to
plaintiffs asserting educational malpractice claims are concerns such as
establishing a duty of care, the courts' perceived inability to arrive at a
standard for assessing breach of that duty and demonstrating causa-
tion.13 9 In other words, the question of whether academic institutions
owe a duty to impart a minimum level of proficiency 140 has been ana-
lyzed by the judiciary as a question of law dependent on public policy
considerations.1 4 1 In refusing to impose a duty on educators, courts ef-
fectively conclude that policy considerations militate against imposing
such a duty. 14 2 The following examination reveals, however, that these
and other policy concerns identified by courts cannot withstand critical
evaluation.
1. Inability to Create a Standard of Care
A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must show: (1) the existence
of a legally recognized duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a
graduate, who had failed a state bar examination on three occasions, alleged that his fail-
ure resulted from the inferior education he received from Southern University School of
Law. Id. at 114. The court was able to dispose of the case without making a determination
of the ultimate issue. It upheld the lower court dismissal of the action on grounds that
there had been no legislative waiver of immunity, which would permit the action to go
forward against the named defendants. Id. at 116. The court in reaching this result char-
acterized the action as one grounded in tort rather than contract.
In Beaman v. Des Moines Area Community College, No. 158532, Polk County, Iowa
(Sept. 28, 1976), plaintiffs asserted a negligence action against the community college.
Their action arose out of defendant's alleged negligent failure to comply with standards
and guidelines regarding the qualifications of instructors and classroom equipment. As-
sessing the case as one presenting a novel legal issue, the court held in favor of defendant
due to plaintiffs' inability to establish the duty element of a negligence claim. In this re-
gard, it relied on the policy arguments stated by the court in Doe v. San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), the intermediary opinion in Peter W.
138. CoLLs, supra note 35, at 8 (concluding no plaintiff has prevailed in a pure educa-
tional malpractice claim); Funston, supra note 37, at 750; Butler, supra note 50, at 609
(stating that only one court has recognized educational malpractice as a viable cause of
action against public educators); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 431. The term "pure" denotes
suits premised on academic negligence in contrast to suits premised on theories such as
fraud, contract, or violation of statutory or constitutional provisions.
139. See Cohen, supra note 35.
140. Funston, supra note 37, at 747-48; Joan Blackburn, Educational Malpractice: When
Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 119 (1978).
141. W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oF TORTS § 37, at 236
(5th ed. 1984); Blackburn, supra note 140, at 119-20; McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
142. McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
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breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) that the breach was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury; and (4) injury to plaintiff.1 43 Thus, as-
suming educators owe a duty of care to students, a standard of care must
be developed in order to determine a breach of the duty.144 The per-
ceived impossibility of establishing such a standard of care has been em-
phasized by courts refusing to recognize educational malpractice
claims. 14 5 The Peter W court articulated this concern stating: "We find
in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of care' against
which the defendants' alleged conduct may be measured .... 146
Apprehension over the feasibility of establishing a workable stan-
dard of care is somewhat justified due, in large part, to the amorphous
nature of the education process. Educators often disagree as to peda-
gogical techniques employed in the educating process as well as the con-
tent of instruction comprising the education process.14 7 Since a breach
of the standard of care in cases involving professional malpractice is es-
tablished by expert testimony, 14 8 critics of educational malpractice
claims assert that this lack of consensus results in the inability of experts
to provide an applicable standard of care.149
Notwithstanding the merit1 50 ofjudicial concern over the inevitable
difficulties associated with developing and evaluating a standard of care,
courts deciding educational malpractice claims have made no serious ef-
fort to create such a standard. 15 1 Courts have not made an in-depth
analysis of what they have come to consider the inherently impossible
task of developing a standard of care to measure an educator's breach of
duty. i5 2 The resulting judicial approach automatically forecloses the
possibility of assessing whether, in a given situation or context, a worka-
ble standard of care can, in fact, be devised. 153 This policy concern,
143. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 164-65.
144. Id. at 205; William F. Foster, Educational Malpractice: A Tort for the Untaught?, 19 U.
BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 161, 205 (1985); Funston, supra note 37, at 779; Blackburn, supra
note 140, at 126; Nancy L. Woods, Comment, Educational Malfeasance: A Cause of Action for
Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383, 396 (1978).
145. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976).
146. Id.
147. Funston, supra note 37, at 780; Terrence P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doc-
trine to the Teaching Profession, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 494 (1982); AliceJ. Klein, Note, Educa-
tional Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13
SuFFouc U. L. REV. 27, 39 (1979); McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
148. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 188-89.
149. One commentator articulated this argument: "In medical malpractice cases, an
expert witness can take the stand and provide evidence on the correct and accepted stan-
dard of performance to which the particular doctor should have adhered. No such expert
can offer a single clear-cut educational standard for the teacher to follow." Blackburn,
supra note 140, at 127.
150. Foster, supra note 144, at 190-91.
151. Id. at 19 1; Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 489 (arguing the Peter T. court should
have attempted to define a standard of care).
152. Foster, supra note 144, at 191.
153. Id. One advocate of imposing a duty of care on educators suggests that courts'
conclusions regarding the standard of care are based on dubious assumptions.
First, it is assumed without any deliberation that the appropriate standard of care
is that of the reasonable man on the street and not a standard drawn from the
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therefore, becomes a convenient justification for a blanket rule of non-
liability.
Moreover, the judiciary has exaggerated the ambiguous nature of
the education process in buttressing its conclusion that a standard of
care cannot be devised. 15 4 Despite differences as to pedagogy, it is
likely that experts could agree on the basic goals of education as well as
the most effective methods of teaching. 155 In addition, a well-developed
body of law involving professional malpractice in other areas is available
to assist the judiciary in devising a model standard of care for educa-
tional malpractice.
15 6
2. Difficulty of Establishing Causation
Intertwined with the concern of developing a standard of care is the
judiciary's perceived difficulty of establishing causation. Although
courts in educational malpractice cases rarely reach the question of cau-
sation, they nevertheless identify it as another consideration militating
in favor of non-recognition of educational malpractice claims. The ar-
gument underlying this policy concern is that a school's negligence is
but one possible cause of a student's academic failure. 15 7 In Donohue,
the court identified such factors as the "student's attitude, motivation,
temperament, past experience and home environment" as playing criti-
cal roles in the process of learning.
158
Indeed, the broad range of factors which potentially contribute to a
student's educational failure present a serious obstacle for a plaintiff
asserting an educational malpractice claim. Nevertheless, the law does
professional or occupational group to which educators belong. Secondly, it is
assumed that if there exists no consensus about how best to engage in or pursue a
certain activity, about whether the activity should be undertaken at all or about
the goals of the activity, then there can be no standard of care.
Id.
154. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 494.
155. Foster, supra note 142, at 221 (remarking most educators attest the sufficiency of
their knowledge and experience to determine whether teaching methods, practices or poli-
cies are unacceptable). Also, if within a particular field there are various schools of
thought, a professional's conduct is judged in accordance with the standard common to
the field to which he or she subscribes. Sherman, supra note 12, at 680.
156. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 496; see also Foster, supra note 144, at 224-26
(suggesting ways to establish negligent conduct by an educator); Blackburn, supra note
140, at 126 (suggesting an analogy can be drawn to the standard of care in medical mal-
practice cases that requires physicians to "exercise the care and skill ordinarily exercised
by other members of the profession"); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 457 (arguing the courts in
these cases, as in other professional negligence cases, will avail themselves of highly quali-
fied expert witnesses to both establish and assess the standard of care).
157. The Peter W. court expressed its concern with the plaintiff's likelihood of establish-
ing causation:
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the
schools, or its failure, are [sic] influenced by a host of factors which affect the
pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the con-
trol of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, en-
vironmental; they may be present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified.
Peter IV, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.




not require that a defendant's conduct be the sole cause of the plaintiff's
injury in order to establish the causation element in a negligence cause
of action. The plaintiff is only required to make a showing that the de-
fendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the particular in-
jury1 59 "The test for causation is one of significance, rather than of
quantity."1 60 In short, the issue of causation is one of proof' 61 and, as
such, courts should not rely upon it as a rationale to automatically reject
educational malpractice claims.
It is one thing to recognize that establishing cause in fact in
many educational malpractice situations may be difficult and
that, in a particular case, the difficulties may prove insurmount-
able. It is quite another thing to conclude that merely because
difficulties may be encountered in showing causation no educa-
tional malpractice actions must be entertained and the defend-
ant, as a consequence, should be relieved from liability.
162
In summary, the resolution of the standard of care and causation
issues poses certain difficulties which, in a particular case, would bar re-
covery. Resorting to these difficulties as a rationale for adopting a broad
rule of non-liability, however, is totally unsatisfactory inasmuch as courts
conveniently dispose of educational malpractice actions without assess-
ing the interests of the alleged victims. Finally, this approach precludes
a case-by-case determination of educational malpractice claims and the
possibility of recovery by a student who could otherwise establish a stan-
dard of care and causation.1 63
3. Non-Interference Premised on Judicial Incompetence
The judiciary buttresses its refusal to recognize a tort action for ed-
ucational malpractice by pointing to a policy of non-interference in mat-
ters of education. This policy is premised on the belief that courts lack
the expertise to formulate workable standards for teaching and learn-
ing16 4 or to address the types of complex educational issues inevitably
involved in educational malpractice suits.1 65 This argument serves as a
159. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 267.
160. Blackburn, supra note 140, at 131.
161. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 498; Foster, supra note 144, at 234 (concluding
this ultimate question of proof is the most serious impediment to educational malpractice
claims).
162. Foster, supra note 144, at 237.
163. Id. at 191.
164. Funston, supra note 37, at 797. Critics of educational malpractice argue that the
judiciary lacks training in substantive educational policy issues to make informed evalua-
tions. Id. The critics claim that "Ithe determination of the requisite level of instructional
quality within a school system and how to attain it is a fundamental policy-making function
that educators are better equipped to handle than are courts. Thejudicial process, there-
fore, should eschew discretionary decisions of educator competence." Id. at 798. See Mc-
Bride, supra note 45, at 485 (courts would have difficulty formulating an appropriate
standard of care due to the diversity of opinions as to the nature of the learning process).
165. Funston, supra note 37, at 793; McBride, supra note 45, at 485; Wilkins, supra note
36, at 431-32 (judicial reluctance to intervene in matters of education stems from the
complexities of the education process, which require educators and administrators to exer-
cise professional judgments on a daily basis).
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surrogate for the basic policy consideration: the legitimacy of the judici-
ary to participate in matters of educational policy. 16 6
As is true of policy concerns relating to causation and standard of
care, the courts exaggerate the lack of judicial expertise rationale as a
justification to reject educational malpractice claims. 16 7 This argument
loses its force in view of judicial involvement in the areas of medicine,
law, accounting, psychiatry and other professional fields where courts
are willing to review policy making-activities. 168 Moreover, courts inter-
cede in matters requiring the assessment of the quality of educational
programs and substantive educational issues such as those in desegrega-
tion cases. For example, courts must evaluate the quality of education in
racially segregated schools and, in financing cases, assess the impact fi-
nancing has on the quality of the education meted out.169
This rationale also rests on the unsound premise that those with
special expertise should be afforded absolute deference to safeguard the
various interests which the law protects. 170 Although the "formulation
and implementation" of educational practices and policies are best left
to school teachers and administrators, courts should not afford total def-
erence and abandon the problem of educational malpractice to
educators. 171
4. Excessive Litigation
The final specific policy concern influencing courts is the fear of
adverse consequences to the educational process if educational malprac-
tice causes of action are legally recognized. This concern has typically
been expressed in terms of the potential imposition of unlimited liability
on school systems. 172 Those who agree with this concern argue that
recognizing an educational malpractice cause of action would burden
schools with substantial damage awards and further divert resources
available to provide education. 173 In other words, courts fear a flood of
claims, many of which would be either frivolous or feigned. 174 The
166. Klein, supra note 147, at 37.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 40; John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 670 (1978) (suggesting the difficulty
in understanding issues related to educational malpractice is likely to be less than that
encountered in determining issues involved in complex cases such as antitrust, patent in-
fringement and products liability).
169. Robert H. Jerry II, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: Problems of Theory and
Policy, 29 KAN. L. REV. 195, 203 (1981); COLLS, supra note 35, at 367 (the judiciary has
decided matters in the education sphere ranging from school finance, expulsion and dis-
crimination to teacher incompetency and dismissals); Klein, supra note 147, at 38; Mc-
Bride, supra note 45, at 489; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 440.
170. Elson, supra note 168, at 669.
171. Id. at 677-78.
172. Funston, supra note 37, at 793; McBride, supra note 45, at 486 (stating the poten-
tial expense to public schools is another reason for denying educational malpractice
claims).
173. Funston, supra note 37, at 801; Klein, supra note 147, at 36, 41; McBride, supra
note 45, at 492.
174. Funston, supra note 37, at 793.
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court in Peter W. summarized this objection as follows:
To hold them to an actionable "duty of care," in the discharge
of their academic functions, would expose them to the tort
claims-real or imagined-of disaffected students and parents
in countless numbers. They are already beset by social and fi-
nancial problems which have gone to major litigation, but for
which no permanent solution has yet appeared .... The ulti-
mate consequences, in terms of public time and money, would
burden them-and society-beyond calculation.'
75
Despite the legitimacy of this concern, justice should not be denied
and wrongs should not go uncorrected simply because of an increase in
litigation.' 76 It is inappropriate for a court to deny a meritorious claim
due to uncertainties related to how such claims will be handled or be-
cause such claims will lead to the filing of other meritorious claims. 177
In addition, the time and expense of such litigation-attorneys fees, ex-
pert witness fees and court costs-render it unlikely that a flood of litiga-
tion would ensue if this cause of action was given recognition.1 78
Moreover, imposing liability for educational malpractice might en-
courage institutions "to develop ... effective internal procedures for the
fair out-of-court resolution of conflicts over.., educational injuries."1 79
C. Policy Concerns in the Student-Athlete/University Context
The foregoing criticism of the policy reasons given to reject educa-
tional malpractice actions apply with equal, if not greater, force in the
student-athlete/university context. First, the types of misconduct al-
leged by student-athletes do not in fact challenge educational meth-
ods.' 80 Rather, student-athletes complain of active and passive conduct
175. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (citations omitted).
176. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 504 (arguing a fear of increased litigation does
not justify leaving a deserving plaintiff without a remedy); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 439;
Woods, supra note 144, at 395.
One educational malpractice critic disagrees and argues that these generalized objec-
tions to the excessive litigation rationale lose their muster when particularized to the edu-
cational malpractice context. Funston, supra note 37, at 795-96. Professor Funston asserts
that these critics overlook the sheer number of potential litigants if educational malprac-
tice becomes a viable cause of action. Id. at 796. But see Foster, supra note 144, at 195
(arguing there is a lack of empirical evidence to support such a conclusion). This conclu-
sion can only be supported if there is a substantial number of successful malpractice
claims, which is an unlikely result given the reasons previously discussed. Professor Foster
also attempts to discredit this concern by arguing that educational institutions are in a
considerably better position than students to distribute the losses resulting from educa-
tional malpractice. Foster notes that institutions can shift the losses to the public through
taxes or procure liability insurance. Id.
177. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 384; accord WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 51 (1983)
("It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court
ofjustice to deny relief on such grounds.").
178. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 386-87; Foster, supra note 144, at 192-93;Jay M. Pabian,
Note, Educational Malpractice and Minimal Competency Testing: Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?,
15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 101, 108 (1979-80).
179. Elson, supra note 168, at 657.
180. Sherman, supra note 12, at 682.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
by colleges and universities impeding their ability to acquire an educa-
tional opportunity. Improper conduct appears with failing to provide
sufficient study time or independent and satisfactory counseling and
tutoring, with disregarding student-athletes' progress towards educa-
tion, with channeling student-athletes into classes which lack substantive
education merit and with passing student-athletes to higher levels to
maintain their academic eligibility.' 8 1
The above-described conduct also assists in establishing the causa-
tion element of negligence that presents a significant evidentiary hurdle
that the student-athlete must traverse.18 2 The evidentiary burden aris-
ing from the necessity of establishing causation is justifiable inasmuch as
the student-athlete shares the responsibility for his or her education. 
183
Nevertheless, the joint nature of the responsibility does not lead to an
inescapable conclusion that a causal connection cannot be established
between the university's conduct and its failure to afford the student-
athlete an educational opportunity.
The principle that causation can be established notwithstanding the
existence of several contributing factors is equally applicable to this con-
text.184 Therefore, to establish causation, a court would be required at
a minimum to focus on two categories of conduct-that of the student-
athlete and that of the institution. With respect to the former, the stu-
dent-athlete would be required to proffer evidence demonstrating an in-
nate intellectual capacity to learn and the motivation, diligence and
intention to pursue a course of study, which would result in the acquisi-
tion of basic educational skills.
18 5
Proving that the institution's conduct was a substantial factor in the
resulting harm can be accomplished through evidence focusing on sev-
eral factors including:
(1) the breadth of the student athlete's curriculum; (2) the
type of guidance offered; (3) the number of absences occa-
sioned by athletic commitments; (4) compilation of exams, pa-
pers and assignments; (5) a record of complaints by the
student and/or his guardian; (6) the school's standing and rep-
utation in a given athletic sport; (7) evidence of passing grades
in courses never attended; and (8) evidence tending to show
that the student placed an inordinate degree of trust in the
coach and his staff.1
8 6
Evidence related to these and other forms of the institution's conduct
181. See Davis, supra note I, at 789-90; Sherman, supra note 12, at 679-80 (identifying
the types of negligence typically alleged by student-athletes).
182. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 121 (noting the onerous evidentiary burden con-
fronting the student-athlete); Sherman, supra note 12, at 684 (difficulties inherent in estab-
lishing causation provide a defense institutions can assert against these claims).
183. Johnson, supra note 7, at 121.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
185. See Foster, supra note 144, at 238-39;Johnson, supra note 7, at 121; Sherman, supra
note 12, at 684; Michael N. Widener, Note, Suits by Student-Athletes Against Colleges for Ob-
structing Educational Opportunity, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 467, 481 (1982).
186. Johnson, supra note 7, at 121; see supra text accompanying note 181 (describing the
nature of potential improper conduct by colleges and universities).
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will enable the trier of fact to determine the causal connection between
the conduct and the student-athlete's failure to obtain an educational
opportunity. Moreover, due to the nature of the alleged harm, creating
a standard of care will not constitute an insurmountable task. Whether a
university breached its duty of care could be determined by focusing on
the above-described conduct. All of these instances of improper con-
duct are capable of assessment under professional standards commonly
used in education such as state accreditation standards and the educa-
tional standards the student-athlete's university has adopted.
1 8 7
In addition, colleges would not be subjected to the same potential
exposure as public schools. 18 8 First, the duty imposed on universities
would be limited to student-athletes and thus would create a smaller
pool of possible litigants. 18 9 Second, the scope of the duty could be
defined to balance and protect the interests of the student-athlete and
his or her school. Defining the duty as providing an educational oppor-
tunity instead of a guarantee would limit the potential liability of the
institution. 190 Finally, student-athletes would have to overcome eviden-
tiary obstacles in proving their claims. "In order to succeed in asserting
educational malpractice, a student would have to withstand evidence
that he or she did not attend class, missed tutoring sessions, failed to
complete assignments, showed a non-cooperative attitude, and didn't
[sic] participate in class or tutoring sessions."' 91
D. Consequences of Focusing on Policy Concerns
The foregoing discussion illustrates the basic weaknesses in policy
rationales traditionally employed by courts to justify denial of educa-
tional malpractice claims. By adhering to what has become a blanket
rule of non-liability for educational malpractice, courts automatically
preclude meritorious claims from consideration.' 9 2 This is particularly
disturbing given that victims of educational malpractice incur real and
measurable injuries. 193 One writer observed:
[R]efusal to recognize the cause of action is incompatible with
accepted tort principles, and that a cogent theory supporting
187. See Sherman, supra note 12, at 681.
188. Id. at 682.
189. Davis, supra note 1, at 785-86 (discussing the justifications for limiting the univer-
sity's duty to student-athletes). The author of a recent student note argues that it is im-
proper to compare public schools to universities. The latter are under no obligation to
engage in intercollegiate competition but do so because of the benefits perceived as flow-
ing from college athletics. Since colleges voluntarily create major sports programs to fur-
ther these objectives, they should not be able to take advantage of the fear of litigation
rationale as a shield to potential liability arising out of the manner in which they conduct
their sports programs. Sherman, supra note 12, at 682-83.
190. Davis, supra note 1, at 785.
191. Sherman, supra note 12, at 683.
192. Woods, supra note 144, at 395. Commentators have been troubled by the courts'
failure to allow action on educational injuries given the plight of illiterate high school
graduates who cannot read at a level sufficient to function in a modem, information-inten-
sive work environment. Klein, supra note 147, at 39-40.
193. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 432.
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nonrecognition cannot be articulated within the confines of the
accepted principles and the general policies upon which those
principles are based. If special policies justifying nonrecogni-
tion exist, then that result should be legislatively prescribed,
rather than judicially pronounced in a manner that is antitheti-
cal to the recognized, traditional tort principles.
19 4
Equally disturbing is that undue reliance on these dubious policy
considerations channels the judiciary away from the ultimate issue-
whether a particular plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection
against the defendant's conduct. The remainder of this Article focuses
on this critical issue in the context of the student-athlete/university
relationship.
In attempting to respond to the ultimate question, the foregoing
discussion arguably shows that courts should recognize an educational
malpractice action in the student-athlete/university context merely due
to the weaknesses of the policy justifications relied on to reject educa-
tional malpractice claims. While the weaknesses are clear, this Article
goes beyond a criticism of the foregoing policy reasons. Rather, within
the confines of traditional tort doctrine and thus independent of these
criticisms, the academic interests of student-athletes are deserving of
protection against the conduct of their institutions, which deny them an
educational opportunity. In other words, traditional tort doctrine, di-
rectly or by analogy, provides precedent compelling courts to create a
common law duty on the part of colleges and universities to confer an
educational opportunity to student-athletes.
III. ESTABLISHING A SOURCE FOR THE DUTY
A duty recognized by law is the threshold element of a negligence
cause of action. 195 As a general proposition, no duty exists absent a
special circumstance. 196 This rule of law has been applied to absolve
universities from liability to students, although not without exception.
Courts demonstrate a willingness to impose a duty on colleges to pro-
tect students where a special relationship exists. These circumstances
and the justifications for imposing a duty of care are discussed below.
A. Tort Liability of Post-Secondary Institutions to Students
1. Liability Premised on In Loco Parentis?
In the early part of this century, the doctrine of in loco parentis 19 7 -
194. Jerry, supra note 169, at 196.
195. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 164-65.
196. Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and
the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. LJ. 471, 472 (1990).
197. The doctrine of in loco parentis originally appeared during the late 18th Century in
England as a defense to civil and criminal actions brought by parents against private tutors
responsible for administering corporal punishment to students. Id. at 473; see also William
M. Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENy. LJ. 511, 514 (1968); Perry A.
Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15J.L. & EDuc. 271, 273
(1986) (employing doctrine as a defense to assault and battery actions against teachers).
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"in the place of a parent" ' 9 8 -defined the student/university relation-
ship. In its fullest form, in loco parentis permitted colleges to not only
devise, implement and administer student discipline, but to foster a stu-
dent's physical and moral well-being. 19 9 Focusing on this latter notion
of the physical welfare of students, consideration was given to whether
the authority that permitted colleges to govern student conduct carried
with it a correlative legal duty owed by institutions to protect stu-
dents.20 0 Thus, the question arises whether in loco parentis, the paradig-
matic model for the student-college relationship, 20 creates a special
relationship between students and colleges such that a duty is imposed
on the latter to not only exercise control over their students' conduct
but, reciprocally, to protect their students' welfare.
20 2
Serious doubt has been cast over whether the in loco parentis doctrine
ever provided the basis for imposing tort liability on colleges for injuries
to students. This uncertainty arises in part from the dearth of reported
cases 20 3 identifying in loco parentis as the theoretical justification for im-
The judiciary developed the notion that surrogate parents such as tutors or schoolmasters
possessed the same authority to punish children as the children's parents. Beaney, supra,
at 514. Thus, a school authority had the right to control and discipline the child since the
school was viewed as standing in the place of the parent. Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Note,
Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. LJ. 253, 253-54 (1973); David M.
Rabban, Note,Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance,
26 STAN. L. REv. 95, 97 n. 15 (1973) (stating in loco parentis transferred the parental discre-
tionary authority to academic institutions).
The doctrine was first applied formally to higher education in Gott v. Berea College,
161 S.W. 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913). VictoriaJ. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Stu-
dent-University Contractual Relationship, 33 KAN. L. REv. 701, 705, n.35 (1985); Buchter, supra,
at 253 n.4; Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 473-74. In Gott the court stated:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral wel-
fare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end,
they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment of
their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or regu-
lations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to the discretion of the
authorities or parents, as the case may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion,
the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or
against public policy.
Gott, 161 S.W. at 206.
Due to the increasing complexity of modern disputes between students and educa-
tional institutions, the judiciary abandoned its reliance on the in locoparentis doctrine. Bea-
ney, supra, at 515 (explaining that many courts found the doctrine inadequate to provide
the foundation for determining the rights of participants in complex university affairs);
Dodd, supra, at 705 n.35 (noting that in loco parentis was supplanted in later years by con-
tractual theories since the doctrine was too narrow to resolve the myriad of educational
disputes satisfactorily); Buchter, supra, at 254 (stating the limited applicability of the doc-
trine, as in disputes over academic performance, increased the need for alternative
theories).
198. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 197, at 271.
199. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 474.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 476 n.21.
202. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979).
203. Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941), has been iden-
tified by some as an illustration of a court's reliance on the in loco parentis doctrine to im-
pose liability on a college. In Lillywhite, a student sustained personal injuries resulting
from an explosion in a chemical laboratory experiment. Id. at 838. The court relied in
part on the plaintiff's student status to impose liability grounded on improper supervision
by her instructor. Id. at 840-41. The court reasoned that the university stood in the place
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
posing liability on a college or university.20 4 Moreover, a reexamination
of the few cases previously believed to illustrate instances premising a
college's tort liability on in loco parentis further challenges the proposi-
tion that the doctrine once provided a doctrinal basis for liability for
student injuries.
20 5
The 1960s saw the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine as students
challenged the rigid controls that the doctrine authorized institutions to
exert over students' affairs. 20 6 A subsidiary effect of greater student
control of their affairs is that students no longer expect or demand to be
protected by universities. 20 7 Thus, rejection of the doctrine as a basis of
of the student's parents and owed a duty to protect the student from physical harm. See
also Barr v. Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc'y, 190 N.Y.S. 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921), where the
court acknowledged that a college or university could be held liable for a student's injuries
caused by the institution's servant. Id. at 297.
204. James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges' Increasing Exposure to Liability: The
New Loco Parentis, 16J.L. & EDUC. 453, 456 (1987).
205. A recent scholarly debate addresses the issue of whether the in loco parentis doc-
trine ever served as a viable theory for imposing tort liability on colleges and universities
for negligence. Szablewicz and Gibbs examined three cases, which they contend support
the notion that a new in loco parentis doctrine is developing as a basis for imposing tort
liability on universities. The authors argue that the extraordinary circumstances under
which negligence liability was imposed in these cases can only be explained by virtue of
relying on elements of the doctrine of in loco parentis. Id. at 461. Szablewicz and Gibbs
contend that:
[I]n each case, the court has struggled with traditional legal theories short of in
loco parentis to define the relationship between the student and college. It is clear,
however, that none of these theories supports the courts' ultimate decisions.
Rather, only something akin to in loco parentis adequately serves to resolve these
cases.
Id. Finally, the authors argue that the limited use of in loco parentis as the basis of a tort
action against a college or university may have arisen not from the inapplicability of the
doctrine but from sovereign immunity, which protected educational institutions from lia-
bility. Id. at 455.
A recent student note challenges these assertions. In Stamatakos, supra note 196, the
author concludes that, although elements of the doctrine continue to exist (e.g. providing
for the health and safety of students), the doctrine of in loco parentis is no longer legally
tenable in the college context. Id. at 475. Indeed, the author argues that a close reading of
cases such as Lillywhite reveals that the courts failed to specifically utilize the doctrine in
reaching a determination of institutional liability. The author further argues that the alter-
native contract, fiduciary and unitary theories are also inappropriate for determining an
institution's tort liability to students. Id. at 476-77.
In the wake of in loco parentis' demise, courts and theoreticians proposed four
models of the student-college relationship: constitutional, contractual, fiduciary
and 'unitary.' All four models suffer from a systemic deficiency that cripples their
use when courts examine institutional tort liability: Not one of the models is
designed to adequately define the student-college relationship when student sues
college for personal injury. It is no surprise, then, that these models only have
been used, if ever, in litigation concerning the college disciplinary rules and regu-
lations, student fees, and facilities use. The models simply do not inform per-
sonal injury suits by students against colleges.
Id. at 481.
206. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139-40 (colleges once used the doctrine to impose strict
regulations on student conduct but students demanded the right to define and regulate
their own affairs).
207. Dodd, supra note 197, at 705 n.35 (concluding that in loco parentis was supplanted
by contractual theories); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 204, at 456 (noting that the rela-
tionship premised on in loco parentis was replaced by an arms-length relationship between
colleges and students); Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 197, at 282 (contractual and constitu-
tional doctrines have replaced in loco parentis as a source of protection for students);
Buchter, supra note 197, at 254 (indicating that courts turned from in loco parentis to the
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the exercise of authority carries a corresponding rejection of the doc-
trine as a basis to impose tort liability on institutions.20 8 Therefore, in
loco parentis cannot be looked to as precedent or a doctrine to support
imposition of a tort duty on universities in favor of student-athletes.
2. Liability Premised on Special Relationships
In the 1970s and 1980s, courts manifested greater willingness to
impose tort liability on post-secondary institutions for physical injuries
to students.2 0 9 The judiciary, however, has narrowly limited the situa-
tions in which a university will be held liable for such injuries.2 10 Insti-
tutional liability has been limited to those instances where a special
relationship exists between a college and a student.2 1 1 It is important to
note, however, that the arguably unique relationship between students
and colleges is not the basis of the special relationships on which liability
has been premised. 2 12 In other words, courts have turned to special
relationships which exist independent of any relationship arising merely
from a plaintiff's status as a student.2 1 3 This judicial attitude has been
summarized as follows:
Courts have largely disregarded the fact that the* college/uni-
versity-student relationship is a unique one. The institution is
often the center of the student's life-in addition to classroom
education, the institution may provide a place for the student to
live and may be the site of many if not all of the student's extra-
curricular activities.
2 14
Judicial reluctance to recognize a special relationship arising merely out
of the student/university relationship is premised on the belief that in-
stitutions are not insurers of student safety since students are consid-
ered adults capable of caring for themselves.
2 15
written contract between students and universities to define the relationship); Stamatakos,
supra note 196, at 477 (courts have turned to contract which predated the demise of in loco
parentis doctrine as an alternative model).
208. Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 204, at 456 (courts reject claims against colleges
for negligence which may have been successful under the in loco parentis doctrine).
209. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 485.
210. Tia Miyamoto, Comment, Liability of Colleges and Universities for Injuries During Extra-
curricular Activities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1988); Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 489.
211. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 485.
212. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 151-52, 175; BarbaraJ. Lorence, Note, The Univer-
sity's Role Toward Student Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obligation?, 29 DuQ. L. REv. 343, 353
(1991) (claims premised on student status have been unsuccessful). One author notes:
Thus far, courts have not held institutions liable for extracurricular injuries oc-
curring off campus. Courts have been willing to hold institutions liable for inju-
ries sustained by students in a limited number of cases. This disparity in
treatment is largely due to the fact that in an on-campus injury case, the plaintiff
can argue that the institution's status as landowner imposes a duty of care. This
duty has been more readily recognized in the higher education context than a
duty arising from the in loco parentis doctrine, a duty to supervise, or a duty to
control third persons ....
Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 486-87.
213. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353.
214. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 151-52.
215. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979); Miyamoto, supra note 210, at
162, 175.
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Courts have turned to traditionally recognized tort "special rela-
tionships" as a basis for imposing a duty on universities to protect the
interests of students.2 16 For example in Peterson v. San Francisco Commu-
nity College District,2 1 7 the California Supreme Court determined whether
a college possessed a'duty to protect a student from an on-campus phys-
ical assault.2 18 The plaintiff alleged that the college's duty arose out of a
special relationship between herself and the institution. 21 9 In holding
for the plaintiff, the court first explained that as a general matter a duty
might be found where: "(a) a special relation exists between the actor
and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor
and the other which gives the other a right to protection. '2 20 It con-
cluded that the student's status as an invitee and the college's status as a
possessor of premises created a special relationship sufficient to impose
a duty on the latter in favor of the former.2 2 1 Thus, in finding a duty of
care on the part of the college, the court turned to a long-recognized
special relationship-that between a possessor of land and an invitee.
2 22
A similar result was reached in Stockwell v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University.223 A student sustained personal injuries after
being struck in his eye by a bullet fired from a BB gun.224 The student
alleged that the University failed to use reasonable care in maintaining
its premises in a safe condition.2 25 Evidence presented by plaintiff
demonstrated knowledge by the University that the small firearms (in-
cluding BB guns) were being used in the area where the injury occurred,
216. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 162. The special relationships sufficient to impose
liability are those articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). For
example,
[u]nlike the argument that a special relationship exists between a postsecondary
institution and its students which warrants a duty to control another, the duty
arising from an institution's landowner status has clearly been recognized by the
courts, as exemplified by Stockwell and Mortiboys. However, the acceptance of the
landowner duty in the college and university context has nothing to do with the
unique relationship between postsecondary institutions and their students.
Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 173 (citing Stockwell v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 148 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); Mortiboys v. St. Michael's College, 478
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1973)).
217. 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
218. Id. at 1195.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 1198.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 provides in part:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the
land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or
intentionally harmful acts of third persons ... and by the failure of the possessor
to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are
likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid
the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
Id.; accord Richmond v. Ohio State Univ., 564 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989) (uni-
versity could be liable to a student by virtue of its status as an occupant of premises and
the student's status as an invitee).
223. 148 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
224. Id. at 406.
225. Id. at 405.
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notwithstanding signs prohibiting the possession of guns therein. 22 6
Relying on the duty of a landowner to protect invitees from dangerous
conditions on the premises, 22 7 the court reversed the lower court's
grant of a nonsuit. As was true in Peterson, the court relied on the well-
recognized and accepted special relationship between landowner and in-
vitee to impose liability on the University.
2 28
In Bearman v. University of Notre Dame,22 9 plaintiff sued the University
for injuries sustained after she was knocked down by a drunk after a
football game. 23 0 The issue on appeal was whether the University owed
a duty of care to plaintiff for injuries resulting from the acts of a third
party. The court answered affirmatively, holding that the University's
duty to plaintiff arose out of the duty of a landowner to protect an invi-
tee from the harmful acts of third persons.
23 1
Notwithstanding the foregoing illustrations, in the majority of cases
involving suits brought by students, courts have refused to impose negli-
gence liability on colleges and universities for injuries students have sus-
tained. Even in denying liability, however, the judiciary has recognized
the notion that the existence of a special relationship is a sufficient basis
on which to impose duty on colleges and universities. This is illustrated
in the leading case of Bradshaw v. Rawlings,23 2 where the Third Circuit
awarded recovery to a college student injured in an off-campus automo-
bile accident, which occurred on his return from a class picnic.
2 33
The college's liability hinged on whether it owed plaintiff student a
duty of care.23 4 After discussing the evolution of the student/university
relationship and the demise of the doctrine of in loco parentis, the court
held that, absent a special relationship, plaintiff was incapable of estab-
lishing a duty owed by the university to him. The court went on to reject
the notion that beer-drinking by under-age college students alone cre-
ated a special relationship upon which to predicate liability. 23 5 By so
226. Id. at 406.
227. The court characterized the principle that creates the special relationship between
a landowner and invitee as follows: "[A] person invited upon the premises of another may
recover damages from such owner for injuries received owing to the dangerous condition
of the premises known to the owner and not known to the person so injured .... " Id. at
408.
228. See also Mortiboys v. St. Michael's College, 478 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1973) (recogniz-
ing special relationship of college as landowner and student as invitee as providing foun-
dation on which to establish duty owed by college to student).
229. 453 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
230. Id. at 1197.
231. Id. at 1198. The special relationship relied on by the court to impose a duty on
the college is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965). See also
Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1469 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (the court refused to
recognize a special relationship between a student and a university but found that liability
could be based on the university's status as a landowner in operating, maintaining and
supervising its dormitories).
232. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
233. Id. at 137.
234. Id. at 138.
235. Id. at 142. The court refused to impose such a duty based in part on the substan-
tial burden that would be placed on colleges. Other courts followed the view that liability
will not be imposed absent a special relationship. See Fox v. Board of Supervisors of La.
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concluding, the court denied the existence of a unique special relation-
ship between student and university, which could provide the founda-
tion of a duty of care owed by universities to their students.
Nevertheless the court left the door open for liability to be premised on
a traditionally recognized special relationship such as that found in sec-
tion 320 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which creates a special rela-
tionship when a person takes custody of another under circumstances
where the other is deprived of his normal power of self-protection.
236
B. Justifications for Creating Special Relationships
In a notable recent case, University of Denver v. Whitlock,23 7 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court refused to hold a university liable for personal inju-
ries to a student, but recognized that liability could be premised on a
special relationship. The court framed the dispositive issue as whether
the University owed the student a duty of care to take measures to pro-
tect him from the injuries he sustained. 238 Differentiating nonfeasance
from misfeasance, 23 9 the court held that with the former, liability can
State Univ., 576 So.2d 978, 981-82 (La. 1991) (since the university was not the insurer of
student safety, it was not liable for failing to supervise activities of a rugby tournament
during which a student from another college was injured absent a showing of a special
relationship between the visiting student and university); Crow v. State, 271 Cal. Rptr.
349, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (university not liable for negligent supervision of intoxicated
third-party student who assaulted another student since university did not stand in a spe-
cial relationship with either student); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (the relationship between university and students, without more, does not create a
special relationship placing the university under obligation to protect students from un-
foreseeable harm); Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Wabash College, 495 N.E.2d 227,
232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (nonexistence of a special relationship precluded injured student
from recovering damages from college); Allen v. Rutgers Univ., 523 A.2d 262, 266 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.) (facts established university neither sold nor served alcoholic bever-
ages, therefore the institution could not be held liable for injuries to student on grounds
of special statutory and common law duties imposed upon a licensee not to serve alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated person), cert. denied, 527 A.2d 472 (N.J. 1987).
236. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) defines
the duty of a person having custody of another to control the conduct of third persons:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of an-
other under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of
self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third per-
sons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting
themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of
the third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control.
Id.
For criticisms of the Bradshaw court's holding that the evidence did not support the
existence of a special relationship, see Rita Mankovich Irani, Recent Decision, 19 DuQ. L.
REv. 381 (1981); Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 165-66; Comment, The Student-College Rela-
tionship and the Duty of Care: Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 14 GA. L. REv. 843, 854 (1980).
237. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987). In r1hitlock, injuries resulting from a trampoline acci-
dent rendered plaintiff a quadriplegic. The trampoline was located on a fraternity's prem-
ises. Reversing the trial court's order granting defendant judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the university owed the student a duty to
either remove the trampoline from the fraternity premises or supervise its use. Id. at 56;
see Whitlock v. University of Denver, 712 P.2d 1072 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
238. Wl'hitlock, 744 P.2d at 57.
239. The court distinguished the concepts as follows:
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only attach if there is a special relationship between the parties, which
imposes a duty to act on the defendant. 240 Identifying certain recog-
nized special relationships, 24 1 the court noted that underlying the rec-
ognition of a duty of care in situations involving a special relationship
are the notions of dependence and mutual dependence. The court con-
cluded that student status does not create a special relationship and thus
fails to provide the basis to impose a duty on the University.
24 2
Similarly, the court in Beach v. University of Utah,24 3 in refusing to
hold a university liable to a student absent the existence of a special
relationship discussed the assumptions that underlie special relation-
ships. According to the court, judicially recognized special relationships
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or when one
deprives another of normal opportunities to protect his or her inter-
ests. 24 4 The Beach court further stated that at the heart of these special
relationships is the idea of dependence by one party upon the other or
mutual dependence between them.24 5 The court concluded that the
student/college relationship alone does not constitute a special relation-
ship. 246 According to the court, a realistic assessment of the modem
student/university relationship-the essence of which is education and
not custody-justified the refusal to find a special relationship between
colleges and adult students. It found that since the evidence failed to
demonstrate a special relationship, the University possessed no obliga-
tion to protect or supervise the injured student.
24 7
C. Is the. Relationship Between Student-Athletes and Colleges Special?
The foregoing discussion leads to the critical inquiry: whether the
student-athlete/university relationship has attributes that warrant its
In determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff, the law
has long recognized a distinction between action and a failure to act-'that is to
say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others [misfeasance]
and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from harm [nonfea-
sance] . . . .' Liability for nonfeasance was slow to receive recognition in the law.
'The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance'
the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfea-
sance' he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit
him by interfering in his affairs.'
Id. (quoting KEETON Er AL., supra note 141, § 56, at 373).
240. Id. at 58.
241. The court noted that judicially recognized special relationships include "carrier/
passenger, innkeeper/guest, possessor of land/invited entrant, employer/employee, par-
ent/child, and hospital/patient." Id.
242. In reaching the conclusion that the student/university relationship is not one
based on dependence, the court relied on the analysis and policy rationale enunciated in
Bradshaw and its progeny. Id. at 59-61.
243. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
244. Id. at 415 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1964)).
245. Id. at 415-16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1964)).
The concept of dependence as the essence of special relationships was also noted by the
court in Baldwin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 814, where the court refused to impose liability on a
college for personal injuries suffered by a student during an accident that occurred in the
aftermath of drinking on college grounds.
246. Beach, 726 P.2d at 416, 419.
247. Id.
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designation as a special relationship. If such a relationship exists, it ar-
guably provides the basis that the court in Ross deemed a prerequisite to
imposing tort liability on postsecondary institutions for failing to pro-
vide student-athletes with an educational opportunity. Judge Nordberg,
in refusing to create a negligence cause of action sui generis for student-
athletes, wrote that "a new rule declared through the evolutionary pro-
cess of the common law ought fairly be deduced from existing doc-
trine-something that cannot be said for Ross's claim."' 248
1. The Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction
In determining whether the student-athlete/university relationship
is special, this Article assumes that the institutional conduct of which stu-
dent-athletes complain would constitute nonfeasance. If student-ath-
letes incur emotional and intellectual harm due to failure of colleges and
universities to take affirmative action to provide them with an educa-
tional opportunity, the existence of a special relationship must be
demonstrated in order to impose a duty on these institutions to act.
This is in no way intended to suggest that the alleged improper conduct
cannot be characterized as misfeasance and that a strong case 2 49 does
not exist for imposing tort liability based upon an institution's failure to
exercise reasonable care in carrying out an assumed duty.250 Indeed the
argument can be made that, in the context of educational malpractice
actions by student-athletes, the alleged improper conduct amounts to
both nonfeasance and misfeasance. 25 1 Yet, this Article defines the pur-
ported negligent conduct as nonfeasance in order to focus more directly
on the question of whether a duty exists arising independently of any
248. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (N.D. Il1. 1990).
249. Student-athletes may argue that the express contractual relationship with the uni-
versity contains an educational commitment on the part of the latter. See Davis, supra note
1, at 743. The contract would establish the parameters of the duty. Thus, the university's
failure to use reasonable care in fulfilling its duty would not only constitute a breach of
contract but would also provide grounds for a negligence action. KEETON ET AL., supra note
141, at 660-61 (noting that American courts have extended tort liability for misfeasance in
contract actions where defective performance results in injury to the promisee and the
misperformance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk to the interest of the promisee).
250. Historically, liability is easier to find in cases of misfeasance than those involving
nonfeasance. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 378.
251. Id. at 374 (in practice, determining where to draw the line between conduct that is
active misfeasance, and passive nonfeasance, is not easy); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 18.6, at 729 (2d ed. 1986) (commenting on the tenuous nature of the
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance).
Student-athletes have alleged conduct by their schools that can be characterized both
as active misconduct (misfeasance), and passive inaction (nonfeasance). KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 141, at 373. For example, in his complaint Terrell Jackson alleged that Drake
University failed to provide sufficient study time or independent and satisfactory academic
counseling and tutoring, and disregarded his progress toward an undergraduate degree.
Compl. at 38, Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942 (Iowa Dist. Polk County, May 7,
1990). Such conduct might constitute nonfeasance. On the other hand, Jackson alleged
conduct that could be characterized as misfeasance such as Drake's requiring plaintiff to
take classes that lacked substantive education merit, and requiring plaintiff to submit
plagiarized papers. Id. Similar allegations are contained in the complaint filed by Kevin
Ross against Creighton University. Am. Compl. at 8-9, Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F.
Supp. 1319 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (No. 89-C-6463).
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duty that may be owed to students by virtue of the express contract. In
other words, does traditional tort doctrine provide a basis for imposing
liability on universities for failing to provide student-athletes with an ed-
ucational opportunity independent of the "manifested intent, '2 5 2 which
resides in their express contract?
2. The Nature of the Student-Athlete/University Relationship
a. Express Contractual Relationship
The student-athlete/university relationship is generally recognized
as based upon an express contract.2 53 The Letter of Intent and the
Statement of Financial Aid, 254 which the parties execute, operate as the
primary sources of this express contractual relationship. 255 These docu-
ments define the formal relationship between student-athletes and uni-
versities and set the parameters of their respective rights and
obligations. 25 6 For example, by executing a Letter of Intent, a student-
athlete commits to attend a particular school and restricts his ability to
participate in intercollegiate athletics at other schools.
2 57
While these documents evidencing the express contract provide
some indicia of the essence of the student-athlete/university relation-
ship, they fail to present a complete picture. A complete understanding
of this relationship is achieved by examining the circumstances sur-
rounding, and the conduct that manifests during, the performance stage
of this relationship. 25 8 An analysis of the parties' conduct reveals attrib-
252. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 656.
253. Davis, supra note 1, at 769 (citing to cases recognizing, and commentators argu-
ing, that a student-athlete's relationship with his school is contractual).
254. For a description of these documents as well as an analysis of their legal effect, see
Davis, supra note 1, at 769-72; Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College
National Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1290-92
(1989); Johnson, supra note 7, at 114-16; Widener, supra note 183, at 469-70.
255. See Cozzillio, supra note 254, at 1290.
256. See Davis, supra note 1, at 777 (arguing that due to the vague expression of institu-
tions' educational commitment to student-athletes, it is appropriate to utilize the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as an interpretative tool to define the substance and breadth of
this commitment).
257. See Cozzillio, supra note 254, at 1290 (student-athlete waives right to participate in
sports at another college by executing the Letter of Intent); Davis, supra note 1, at 771
(discussing implications of student-athlete's execution of Letter of Intent).
258. The strictly contractual relationship may also evidence a relationship marked by
dominance and dependence. See supra text accompanying notes 246-50. The first indicator
occurs during the bargaining stage where student-athletes are presented with standard-
form agreements; the parties do not engage in negotiations over the terms of the boiler-
plate agreement. In short, universities are in a superior bargaining position with student-
athletes and their parents. James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organiza-
lion, 61 IND. Lj. 9, 23-24 (1985) (arguing the ability of student-athletes to bargain with
their schools is constrained by collusion between and among universities and noting the
inability of student-athletes to negotiate the terms of these standard contracts); Alfred D.
Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 39,
74-75 (1990) (recognizing that student-athletes, and those acting on their behalf, are at a
bargaining disadvantage with universities); Johnson, supra note 7, at 111 (discussing the
inequities in the bargaining process and the superior bargaining position of universities).
It may also be argued that the restrictions placed on student-athletes by the express
contract denote not only the inequality of the bargaining process, but are consistent with a
relationship of dominance and dependence. SPERBER, supra note 2, at 239-40 (identifying
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utes-mutual dependence between student-athletes and their institu-
tions with the latter as the dominant party in the relationship-that
justify denominating the relationship as special. Therefore, while the
contract creates the relationship between student-athletes and their col-
leges, the duty on the part of the latter can be viewed as arising indepen-
dently of the implied or express terms of the contract by virtue of the
special relationship between them.
259
b. Mutual Dependency
A college's dependency on its student-athletes arises out of the in-
stitution's need for the athletic abilities and services that student-ath-
letes bring to the relationship. In short, colleges depend on student-
athletes to provide services that in turn generate substantial revenues
from intercollegiate competition.2 60 Student-athletes are dependent on
their schools to provide them with an education. 26 1 Athletic scholar-
ships enable student-athletes to gain access to the potential academic
benefits, which are found at colleges and universities. 2 62 Yet the formal
attributes of this relationship fail to reflect the pervasive nature of stu-
dent-athletes' dependency on their schools. It also creates the illusion
of a reciprocal relationship where neither party is in a position of domi-
nance2 63 and obscures the magnitude of the subservience of the stu-
dent-athlete in this relationship.
c. Institutional Dominance and Student-Athlete Subordination
The degree of student-athlete dependency arises out of the perva-
siveness of the control and dominance that schools through their ath-
letic departments exert over every aspect of a student-athlete's college
NCAA restrictions which tilt the relationship in favor of universities); id. at 207-10 (dis-
cussing how one year renewable scholarships vest institutions with significant control over
student-athletes); Johnson, supra note 7, at 114-16 (arguing the Letter of Intent protects
and promotes the university's interests by inflicting severe consequences on student-ath-
letes who wish to play for another school, and noting that universities reserve the right to
retract athletic scholarships).
259. Note, however, that the contract itself may provide additional grounds for liabil-
ity. See Davis, supra note I.
260. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353 (discussing the financial dependency of institu-
tions on their athletes); see Davis, supra note I, at 748-51 (exploring the financial attributes
and implications of the student-athlete/university relationship); Koch, supra note 258, at
11 (characterizing colleges as university-firms creating products such as athletic entertain-
ment, which require the input of people, the most essential of whom is the student-ath-
lete). See generally PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, BACKBOARDS & BLACKBOARDS:
COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ROLE ENGULFMENT 83 (1991) (observing that student-athletes per-
ceive themselves as quasi-employees of colleges); SPERBER, supra note 2, at 208 (providing
a detailed account of the intricacies of intercollegiate finances, and arguing that since the
services of student-athletes are essential to college athletic programs they are akin to em-
ployees of the institutions).
261. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353.
262. Performing athletic services for institutions allows student-athletes access to edu-
cation. SPERBER, supra note 2, at 104-05, 209.
263. See supra text accompanying note 252 (arguing that the formal contractual rela-
tionship is skewed in favor of the university).
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life. In the academic realm, this dominance manifests itself as control
over academic decision-making.
Unlike other students, athletes did not look over course de-
scriptions, schedules, or general education requirements.
Rather, they were registered into specific colleges (business,
engineering, arts and sciences, etc.), majors, and class by ...
the assistant coach in charge of academics. They were usually
(although not always) consulted in the selection of their college
and major, but rarely asked about which courses they would
like to take.
2 6
The end result of athletic department control is limited autonomy of
student-athletes over academic decisions 265 and their inability to handle
such matters independently. 2 66 The intimate involvement of an athletic
department in student-athletes' affairs leads student-athletes to become
dependent on agents of their schools to protect their academic
interests.
2 67
This relationship of dependence and trust which develops in the
academic arena also appears in the social aspects of student-athletes'
lives. For example, student-athletes are required to participate in athlet-
ically related social activities such as booster functions that divert time
away from studying and social activities of their choosing.2 68 More im-
portant is the role of coaches who exert control and influence over both
264. ADLER, supra note 260, at 66-67.
265. Id. at 221. Athletic departments are guided by the goal of maintaining their ath-
letes' eligibility to compete. Thus, they often steer student-athletes into courses that will
help them achieve this goal despite the lack of intellectual depth and challenge. Davis,
supra note 1, at 786-87; Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust; Should College Students Be Paid to
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 256-57 (1990) (asserting academically unprepared stu-
dent-athletes are channeled by schools into "gut" courses that devalue their education);
Widener, supra note 185, at 472 (describing the effects of athletic department control over
student-athletes).
266. Adler and Adler state as follows:
The players, uninvolved in academic decision-making, had little direct contact
with professors (beyond simple class attendance), academic counselors, or aca-
demic administrators. As a result, the players did not learn how to handle these
academic matters, nor-in many cases-were they interested in doing so. They
did not worry that these academic decisions were being made for them, or that
they did not have to process their own academic paperwork; they took it for
granted that this was the way things were.
ADLER & ALDER, supra note 260, at 130.
The adverse consequences of this dependency may extend beyond academics. "I have
seen so many football players struggle with the basics of day-to-day living once they were
out from under their coaches' wings-players who had trouble renting apartments, show-
ing up for work on time, simply doing things on their own." RIcK TELANDER, THE HUN-
DRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO STOP IT
103 (1989).
267. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 260, at 131. The authors argue that this assumption of
responsibility by athletic departments not only creates a relationship of trust, but rein-
forces the importance of student-athletes' athletic identities to the detriment of their aca-
demic identities. Id. The overall consequence of this and other conduct on the part of
institutions is to change the educational orientation of student-athletes from one that
might have prepared them for careers after collegb to one that maintains their athletic
eligibility. Id. at 221. The ultimate impact is that student-athletes are "partly socialized to
failure." Id. at 230.
268. Id. at 95.
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the social and academic spheres of student-athletes' college careers.2 69
Coaches often become surrogate parents for student-athletes who can
significantly influence their social identities during their college ten-
ure.2 70 Moreover, because of their role, coaches assume they can influ-
ence both academic and non-academic decisions made by student-
athletes. 271 As one author notes, because young people "tend to inter-
nalize personal-social characteristics of adults whom they admire and re-
spect ... coaches have the potential for powerfully influencing attitudes
and values of their athletes. ' 27 2 Coaches can exert this influence in a
number of ways, including discouraging particular majors because the
resulting time demands might conflict with a student-athlete's time com-
mitment to his sport. 273 In summary, a student-athlete's position at
a college or university can be characterized as "institutionalized
powerlessness.
'2 74
D. The Special Nature of the Student-Athlete/University Relationship as a
Basis for Tort Liability
The foregoing demonstrates that, while the student-athlete/univer-
sity relationship is one of mutual dependency, the institution is clearly
the dominant party in the relationship. As a result, student-athletes are
vulnerable and particularly dependent on their institutions. 2 75 This de-
pendence and reliance is particularly true with respect to student-ath-
letes' academic affairs. In short, colleges and universities exercise
dominion and control over the affairs of student-athletes. As such, a
quasi-fiduciary relationship is created, which mandates that these institu-
tions give at least as much attention to protecting the interests of stu-
dent-athletes as to protecting their own. In the academic realm, such
attention in a particular case may require the institution to engage in
affirmative conduct to assist student-athletes in taking advantage of the
educational opportunities colleges offer. The requirement that institu-
tions engage in affirmative conduct is particularly justifiable given the
economic advantages that accrue to colleges and universities as a result
of their relationships with student-athletes.
2 7 6
269. Coaches develop a relationship of trust and confidence with student-athletes that
typically begins during recruitment. See ALEXANDER WOLFF & ARMEN KETEYIAN, RAW RE-
CRUITS 136 (1990); Davis, supra note 1, at 786-87.
270. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 258, at 85, 120-25. One author asserts that coaches
are "experts at brainwashing, at keeping their players subservient." TELANDER, supra note
266, at 90.
271. Steven G. Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach
Within the Academic Institution, 16J.C. & U.L. 1, 9 (1989).
272. Id. at 10 (quoting Sage, An Occupational Analysis of the College Coach, in SPORT AND
SOCIAL ORDER: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT, 418-19 (Donald W. Ball &
John W. Loy eds., 1975)).
273. Alessandro, supra note 5, at 293.
274. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 260, at 224.
275. Attributes of the traditionally recognized special relationships are vulnerability
and dependence by one party. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 374.
276. Special relationships typically involve some existing or potential economic bene-
fits to the defendant. Id.
[Vol. 69:1
EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
Thus, the student-athlete/university relationship contains all of the
elements to which courts look in determining whether to characterize a
relationship as special for purposes of imposing a duty of care. Because
of the trust and dependence that student-athletes place in their institu-
tions, the latter possess both a moral and legal obligation to engage in
affirmative conduct providing student-athletes with an educational op-
portunity. Failure to engage in such conduct should constitute actiona-
ble negligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ross court's failure to inquire into the true essence of the stu-
dent-athlete/university relationship eliminated from consideration the
concept of special relationships as the precedent the court believed was
required for it to recognize an educational malpractice action on behalf
of student-athletes. Yet, as we have seen, residing within the student-
athlete/university relationship are attributes justifying the expansion of
the judicially recognized special relationships to include this relation-
ship. Indeed, such an expansion is not unwarranted as exhibited by re-
cent instances where courts have relied upon the concept of the special
relationship to create a duty of care and thereby impose tort liability.
277
In addition, the notion of the special relationship as the source for
requiring a party to engage in affirmative conduct to protect the affairs
of another is a well-recognized legal doctrine. Consequently, imposing
a tort duty on colleges and universities in favor of student-athletes
would not be as novel and unprecedented as it might first appear. To
the contrary, creating such a duty is consistent with and falls within the
contours and strictures of well-recognized tort doctrine. Thus, it ren-
ders ineffective and inapplicable to the student-athlete/university con-
text the analysis and justifications that the judiciary has traditionally
employed in rejecting educational malpractice claims.
[Author's Note: On March 2, 1992, the Seventh Circuit issued its
decision in Ross v. Creighton, No. 90-2509 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 1992), af-
firming in part and reversing in part the lower court's judgment. Rely-
ing on the policy justifications articulated by the district court, the
277. Story v. Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990) (breach of contract may give
rise to tort damages where special relationship exists); Arnold v. National County Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (special relationship between in-
sured and insurer creates duty of good faith and fair dealing which may give rise to tort
liability); Dutton v. Mitek Realty Corp., 463 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(knowledge of a dangerous condition at the time city issued certificate of occupancy cre-
ates special relationship establishing independent duty on part of city to prevent foresee-
able harm); Bodewig v. K-Mart Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (employer and
employee special relationship justified employee's tort recovery for emotional distress
arising out of employer's outrageous conduct); Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (expanding special relationship concept to impose duty on landlord
to protect tenants from third-party crimes committed on premises); see Basaloco-Lapo v.
United States of America, No. 89-15348, 1991 WL 172381 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1991) (deny-
ing recovery but recognizing that the special relationship between physician and patient
may give rise to tort liability).
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Seventh Circuit concluded the Illinois Supreme Court would not recog-
nize the tort of educational malpractice. Id. at 8. For the same reasons,
it held that Illinois would reject any claim for "negligent admission." Id.
at 9. With respect to Ross's contract claim, the court first noted that a
breach of contract claim challenging the sufficiency of the educational
instruction would fail since it constitutes an "attempt to repackage an
educational malpractice claim as a contract claim." Id. at 12. The court
reasoned, however, that a breach of contract action may be available
where the essence of the complaint is the defendant's failure to honor an
"identifiable contractual promise." Id. Reading Ross's complaint as al-
leging that the University failed to honor a specific promise that he
would be able meaningfully to participate in the school's program of
study, the court remanded the matter for consideration of whether Ross
was barred from "any participation in and benefit from the University's
academic program... ." Id. at 14.]
